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Bancller and Grinder (1975, 1976) propose a model oE communica­
tion and change which is based on the assumption that the language used 
by an individual directly reflects the sensory nature of his conscious 
experience. A preference for some mode(s) over others for representa­
tion of experience is purportedly evidenced by relatively more frequent 
occurrence in the person's speech of predicates specific to the favored 
mode(s). Further, imagery is said to be more vivid in preferred repre­
sentational systems.
The present study was designed to investigate the relationship 
between modality specific predicate usage and vividness of sensory imag­
ery. Subjects were 42 undergraduate students (22 male, 20 female) who 
participated in order to obtain research credit in their psychology 
course. In Part I of the study, the Sheehan (1967) Shortened Form of 
Betts' (1909) Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery was group administered 
during psychology recitation sections. In Part II, subjects were indi­
vidually seen and a speech sample obtained. Each subject related three 
vivid experiences to the experimenter in monologue form which were 
tape recorded. Transcripts were analyzed for predicate content.
During Part III, subjects were individually interviewed by the experi­
menter who, through appropriate inquiry, sought to ascertain the modal­
ity reference of ambiguous and unspecified predicates in the speech sam­
ple. Each subject ultimately obtained, for each of five sensory
ix
modalities, imagery vividness scores and predicate frequency scores for 
three language sub-samples and the total language sample.
Contrary to expectation, imagery vividness was not found to cor­
relate with frequency of predicate usage for the sensory modalities. 
Pattern analyses run separately on imagery scores and on each language 
sub-sample and total language sample, however, did reveal groups of sub­
jects with distinct patterns of strengths and weaknesses across modali­
ties. A salient feature of the imagery pattern analysis is the moder­
ately high vividness of kinesthetic imagery characterizing all identi­
fied groups and the considerable variability evident in all other modes. 
In contrast, all language pattern analyses show very high kinesthetic 
predicate frequency and very low olfactory and gustatory predicate usage 
for all groups. Constituency of groups was not maintained across lan­
guage sub-samples.
These findings call into question the use of imagery and intro­
spective self-report measures as appropriate to investigation of sensory 
modality preference in representation of experience. In addition, vari­
ous predicate scoring and language data collection problems are noted 
which may have contributed to the insignificant results obtained. More 
explicit language assessment methods and more complete guidelines for 
implementation of the model are needed. Some of the weaknesses inherent 
in the Bandler and Grinder theory are discussed and it is concluded that 




INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Model formation is a process integral to human functioning. At 
all levels of behavioral complexity, from simple sensation to abstract 
cognitive manipulation, man constructs models to represent his experi­
ences .
Bandler and Grinder in The Structure of Magic, Volume I (1975) 
and Volume II (1976) explore the nature of the modeling process and its 
role in human interaction and behavior change. Of particular interest 
to Bandler and Grinder is the facilitation of therapeutic behavior 
change through interaction of psychotherapist and client. Out of their 
clinical and academic explorations in these areas have emerged both a 
theoretical perspective which purports to transmute the modeling phenom­
enon into a potent psychotherapeutic tool as well as an explicit sys­
tematization, or model, of the modeling process itself as it occurs in 
the psychotherapeutic interaction. Bandler and Grinder have termed this 
model of the modeling process their Meta-Model for Therapy (MMT).
The general principles of the Meta-Model for Therapy will be 
more readily comprehensible, and the validity of the theory more intel­
ligibly subjected to experimental investigation, if the lines of reason­
ing Bandler and Grinder have followed in developing the model, the 
assumptions they have made, and implications stemming from these assump­
tions are first briefly reviewed.
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Historical Underpinnings of the 
Meta-Model for Therapy
The Bandler-Grinder Meta-Model for Therapy evolved under the 
influence of a wide range of scientific and philosophical thought, of 
both modern and early vintage. The level of development in fields as 
disparate as genetics, linguistics, and cybernetics provided empirical 
and theoretical data from which Bandler and Grinder were able to dis­
till and synthesize relevant critical elements. This creative synthesis 
of diverse fragments of data and theory culminated in the first success­
ful analysis and systematization of human interaction and change. The 
lines of reasoning which led Bandler and Grinder to construct the Meta- 
Model for Therapy based upon these fragments derive from the philo­
sophical and theoretical perspectives of many renown thinkers. A few 
among these many are the Empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; the 
Idealists, Kant, Hegel, and Vaihinger; as well as semanticists, Korzyb- 
ski and Katz; logicians, Tarski,. Russell, and Whitehead; and linguists, 
Carnap and Chomsky. Experimental findings of psychologists Pribram, and 
Postman and Bruner contributed to Bandler and Grinder's thinking as 
well.
In his Introduction to The Structure of Magic, Volume I, Gregory 
Bateson synopsizes important early developments which set the stage for 
study of human interaction and provided the necessary fragments from 
which Bandler and Grinder were later to arrive at their theory. A foun­
dation was provided in Whitehead and Russell's Theory of Logical Types 
and Von Neumann's Games Theory. Biology supplied the idea of
2
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comparable forms (homologies), linguists the concept of "levels", and 
geneticists that of discontinuity. The idea of binary information 
appeared, with wide-ranging applicability and important implications.
In cybernetics the concern was with homeostasis and self-correction.
All these notions directed effort towards the identification of patterns 
and redundancy. As a result, the concept of hierarchical classification 
developed, particularly regarding orders of messages and how organisms 
code their messages. Bateson and his colleagues in the 1950’s were with 
difficulty attempting to classify communication modes, for example, 
digital, analogic, iconic, kinesic, verbal. Today, turning their atten­
tion instead to the effect of the modes on the communicating individuals 
Bandler and Grinder have met with greater success and offer a Meta-Model 
which explicitly systematizes the patterns characterizing human communi­
cation. Description of their Meta-Model for Therapy will be facilitated 
by first examining the general modeling process with its underlying 
assumptions and basis in philosophy.
Nature of the Modeling Process
Model formation, as described by Bandler and Grinder and con­
sistent with generally accepted thinking in this area, consists of the 
reduction of unwieldy masses of information to more manageable form 
through systematizing selected portions of the original data. Three 
major processes characterize this systematization: generalization, 
deletion, and distortion. Specifically, generalization facilitates con­
densation of information through representation of an entire category of 
stimuli by one element of the set. Deletion is a process of exclusion
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whereby aspects of the data mass are ignored, not incorporated into the 
model. Distortion allows misrepresentation of the data. It must be 
emphasized that due to the inherent nature of these processes of gener­
alization, deletion, and distortion, the model ultimately formed will 
necessarily differ from the original mass of data which it represents. 
This disparity becomes increasingly manifest at higher levels of model 
formation where the material from which the model is being formed is 
already the result of previous modeling processes. This is the essen­
tial nature of model formation, regardless of the type of data being 
systematized.
However, relative to the Meta-Model for Therapy, we are particu­
larly concerned with a special set of data: real world data. How does 
man know the world he lives in? How does he find his way about in it? 
Man has always speculated over the parameters and limitations of his 
existence. This ancient motif of philosophy has been taken up in modern 
times by a group of psychologists seeking to ascertain through rigorous 
experimentation the processes involved in man’s perception of the world. 
In a recent publication, one of these cognitive psychologists, Neisser 
(1976), has proposed a theory of perception which goes beyond earlier 
conceptualizations of the perceptual process in a manner not inconsis­
tent with the Bandler-Grinder formulation. Most modern theories of per­
ception have regarded the perceptual process as involving levels of 
information processing from initial sensory input to ultimate formation 
of the "percept". Neisser suggests instead that perception is a process 
of continuous interaction between perceiver and environment during which 
pre-existing cognitive structures (schemata) affect how the organism
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perceives new sensory stimulation. There is, Neisser believes, a con­
tinuous cycle of modification occurring: (a) a schema directs the 
organism's exploration of the world, (b) certain of the available infor­
mation is sampled, and (c) as a result of the new information the ori­
ginal schema is modified. Further exploration of the world is then 
directed by the modified schema and the cyclical process continues. 
Information already possessed by the organism determines what will be 
perceived next. Schema are defined by Neisser as anticipatory percep­
tions: based on previous experience one anticipates future events.
This is congruent with Bandler and Grinder's view of man as selectively 
attending to available information about the world. Both they and Neis­
ser conceptualize the process as occurring within each sensory modality: 
the individual "chooses" to attend to certain aspects of certain objects 
or events and to ignore others. Bandler and Grinder say he represents 
the experience to himself at a non-verbal, sensory level— Neisser says 
this internal representation is really the construction of an antici­
patory schema which then directs future perception. The basic assump­
tion underlying the Meta-Model for Therapy is that while we live in a 
real world, we do not operate directly upon it. Our commerce with this 
real world is indirect, mediated through maps or representations we form 
of it as a result of our experiences. These maps or representations of 
the world constitute sets of beliefs, ideas about the nature of the 
world. Bfcing the product of the modeling processes, these ideas neces­
sarily differ from the reality they represent, yet serve a guiding func­
tion, predisposing the individual towards particular perceptions and 
interpretations of incoming real world data. In conceptualizing the
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formation of maps or models of the world to guide man's behavior,
Bandler and Grinder drew upon the thinking of the early philosophers and 
were heavily influenced by the more recent philosophy of Vaihinger.
Some of Vaihinger's important contributions to the Meta-Model will be 
briefly described in the following paragraphs.
In his Philosophy of 'As If' (1924/1966), epistemologist 
Vaihinger treats this problem of how man knows objective reality as an 
inferential process. Thought is considered by Vaihinger to originally 
have been an organic function. As such, thought guided man's adaptation 
to the environment, regulated his reactions towards external influences 
and directed his acceptance or rejection of new elements, thus serving 
to preserve man's life. From this starting point at the level of sensa­
tion, logical thought evolved. Vaihinger's Law of the Preponderance of 
the Means over the End applies to this overdevelopment of thought from a 
means serving the end of organic life preservation to a status of auton­
omous function, an end in itself. In this new role, thought has devel­
oped along lines which often depart radically from the material of 
objective reality so that through the often highly complex processes of 
its own invention it seeks to expedite the solution of problems of the 
logical function itself. This subjectivity of thought causes products 
of the logical function to differ from reality while yet serving a use­
ful purpose in enabling man to obtain the things he needs and to get 
about in the world. Representations of the real world, then, while to 
some extent unrealistic or fictional, are to be evaluated in accordance 
with their practical utility rather than against an unknowable Reality. 
If beliefs or ideas about the world lead to accurate prediction of
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objective events and permit the holder of the belief or idea to behave 
successfully in relation to these events, then these representations of 
the world serve a useful purpose. Problem solution, not accurate repre­
sentation of reality is at issue. Fictions are created by the mind in 
order to facilitate problem solving. As Vaihinger urges, "It must be 
remembered that the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the 
portrayal of reality— this would be an utterly impossible task— but 
rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our way about more 
easily in this world" (p. 15). He further notes that "not even elemen­
tary sensations are copies of reality; they are rather mere gauges for 
measuring the changes in reality" (p. 16).
Among numerous fictions created by the logical function 
Vaihinger describes the three which Bandler and Grinder have incorpo­
rated into their Meta-Model as essential characteristics of the modeling 
process: the Fiction of Artificial Classification, Abstractive (Ne-
glective) Fictions, and Schematic Fictions. These correspond, respec­
tively, to generalization, deletion, and distortion as described above.
In Artificial Classification the logical function "provision­
ally substitutes for the correct constructs others which do not 
directly correspond to reality" (p. 17) and then operates with these 
fictional or artificial classes as if they were real. As an example of 
this variety of fiction, Vaihinger cites Linneaus' botanical system and 
the idea of species which impose superficial order into a confused mass 
of phenomena. This provisional ordering allows objects to be arranged 
and labeled and also facilitates man's search for the real or natural
system underlying these phenomena.
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In Abstractive Fictions thought neglects certain important ele­
ments of reality when complexity of the material precludes analysis into 
elemental units. Certain salient features are instead selected to rep­
resent the complete phenomena. For example, Adam Smith's Assumption, 
which holds that all human actions are dictated by egoism, does not cor­
respond to reality. Smith deliberately substituted a fraction of 
reality (egoism) for the complete range of causes and facts actually 
implicated in human behavior.
Schematic Fictions distort reality through oversimplification, 
where a bare skeleton devoid of many features of the reality is used as 
a basis for theorizing. The social and political/economic sciences 
utilize such fictions frequently: the idea of the isolated city, state, 
man, etc.
Regardless of the level of behavioral complexity at which a 
model is being formed, sensorial to abstract thought, these three pro­
cesses typically occur. The import of the cumulative effect of repeated 
applications of the modeling process to a mass of data about the real 
world will be more readily appreciated upon examination of the modeling 
process as it occurs at several levels: sensory input, conscious exper­
ience, and linguistic communication. The potentially significant impact 
of these processes upon interpersonal relationships will become 
apparent.
Sensory Input
Model formation commences in the physiologically intact human 
with the input of sensory data from the real world. The five sensory
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systems typically recognized are: auditory, visual, kinesthetic, olfac­
tory, and gustatory. As Bandler and Grinder point out, data processing 
within any sensory system is necessarily constrained by the neuro­
logical structure of that system. The processing limitations inherent 
in neurological structure act to systematically delete, distort, or gen­
eralize large portions of actual real world data; thus eventuating in 
the initial discrepancy between the real world and individual subjective 
experience of the world. Several examples of this process are cited by 
Bandler and Grinder: within the visual and auditory modalities, both 
the visual spectrum and audible sound are remarkably small segments of 
their respective continua of structurally similar physical phenomena 
(deletion). Sounds below 20 Hz and above 20,000 Hz are not detected by 
man's auditory system, nor are wave forms below 380 and above 680 nano­
meters detected by his visual receptors. We know the actual physical 
phenomena extend beyond man's limited range of perception because modern 
technology has provided the means by which these imperceptible signals 
can be detected and converted into a form accessible to man's sensory 
apparatuses. Within the kinesthetic mode identical physical stimulation 
may be experienced quite differently in different body areas (distor­
tion). Max Weber discovered in the 1800's (Boring, 1957) that individu­
als correctly judged themselves touched at two points on the finger but 
m isperceived equi-distant points touched to the upper arm as a single 
point. In the gustatory system also this phenomena is evident: the 
same chemical substance applied to different areas of the tongue will be 
differentially perceived. For example, a sweet substance is best 
detected At the tip of the tongue and will taste bitter at the base of
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the tongue. Habituation of olfactory sensation is a common experience; 
both pleasant and unpleasant odors tend to subjectively fade as one’s 
exposure to them increases. The olfactory information available in the 
external world is deleted and no longer processed by the brain.
Neuropsychologists have identified the bases for discrepant per­
ceptions, such as those described above, in the neurological structure 
of the sensory systems. For instance, processing of visual information 
causes data received at the retinal receptors in the form of light waves 
to undergo numerous transformations, modifications, and rearrangements 
en route to the visual cortex where perception occurs. Rearrangement of 
the data at one level of the visual system results in a loss of informa­
tion as only some features are extracted, recoded, and transmitted to 
the next higher level. Our sensory experiences, then, provide us a mass 
of data about the real world which is selective and somewhat inaccurate—  
but which constitutes the raw material from which a conscious model of 
the world is formed.
Conscious Experience
Despite previous filtering of real world data by the neuro­
logical limitations of our sensory systems, the normally functioning
/organism is nevertheless bombarded with continuous input over each sen­
sory channel. In order not to be overwhelmed by the tremendous quantity 
of incoming data, he applies the universal modeling principles of gen­
eralization, deletion, and distortion, thereby reducing the amount of 
information with which he must contend. The systematized representa­
tion of the world which he thus acquires permits recognition of patterns
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in incoming data. He consequently generates certain expectations about 
the world within each sensory system. These sensory models reflect 
selected portions of the real world as he, individually, has experienced 
it. Real world data have thus far been twice subjected to generaliza­
tion, deletion, and distortion: first at the sensory input level then 
at the level of conscious experience. While the inaccuracy of the 
resultant conceptualization of the world may be significant, its impact 
upon the individual is determined by the particular generalizations, 
deletions] and distortions he has imposed upon the raw data of his 
experiences. For example, within the auditory mode he may fail to 
attend to (delete) certain sounds in his environment. This may provide 
freedom from distraction or it may impoverish his life if the sounds 
ignored are sources of potential positive reinforcement or important 
information. Generalization can increase "operating efficiency" through 
application of previously learned rules in new contexts— or it can allow 
inappropriate expectations to misguide behaviors toward others. Dis­
torting sensory data by imagining things not previously experienced per­
mits creative thought, but distorting "compliments" into "insinuations" 
can be devastating to interpersonal relationships. These examples sug­
gest considerable variability among individual conceptualizations 
regarding the nature of the world. Not only does a map or model neces­
sarily differ from the reality represented due to the nature of the 
modeling process itself, but the model formed by an individual is partly 
the result of his individual experiences. The model once formed then 
guides future perceptions and experiences of the world, so that individ­
uals may ultimately live in quite different realities.
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Bandler and Grinder describe two processes which promote varia­
tion among individuals in the conscious representation of experiences: 
(a) information from different sensory systems may be combined into a 
single perception: e.g., on the basis of visual and tactual experiences 
we perceive "texture"; (b) data from one input channel may be stored in 
the representational system of a different sensory mode: e.g., hearing 
the distant crack of a shotgun during hunting season we may store the 
visual image of a bloodied deer. Although intact humans have the poten­
tial to create maps or representations within each sensory system, 
Bandler and Grinder note that in coding our experiences we tend to use 
one or more systems more often than the others. Moreover, individuals 
differ in which particular representational systems are more highly 
valued and well-developed. Preferred sensory systems are purportedly 
characterized by a broader range of distinctions and greater vividness 
of imagery. As a result, individuals experiencing the same real world 
situation may represent it to themselves quite differently. Conscious 
experience, then, consists of information about the world which remains 
after the sum total of all sensory input received has been subjected to 
the modeling process. This residual sensory data constitutes the indi­
vidual's map or set of beliefs about the nature of the external world. 
This map guides his behavior. That is, behavior is based on the model 
of the world formulated as a result of experience and how experience is 
represented by the individual.
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Linguistic Communication
Man uses language to represent his experiences to himself and to 
communicate with others. This translation of experience into linguistic 
form constitutes another modeling process and the universal modeling 
principles of generalization, deletion, and distortion operate to pro­
duce a version of the raw data now thrice removed from the real world.
In addition to serving a representation function, natural language is a 
behavioral output system. Behavioral output is the other aspect of 
man's commerce with the real world— complementary to the input and rep­
resentation of sensory data. Many output channels exist for the expres­
sion of our communications to the world and the form of behavioral com­
munication is based upon the representational systems in which sensory 
information about the world is stored. Analogical behaviors are those 
which vary continuously along some dimension: posture, movement, voice 
quality. Due to their continuous nature, this type of behavior is dif­
ficult to analyze, to break down into components. Digital behaviors, 
such as natural language, can more easily be subjected to analysis 
because the elemental units occur in discrete segments: sentences, 
words, syllables, etc. A linguistic grammatical model can be formed to 
represent the structure of language through a highly systematized series 
of rules designed to accurately describe the generation of well-formed 
sentences. Consequently, language is the best understood of all the 
output systems man uses. Because a higher level model formed to system­
atize the operations of another modeling process is a model of a model—  
or meta-model— the linguistic grammatical model is a meta-model for
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language. It represents a modeling process which occurs when conscious 
experience (already the product of an earlier modeling process applied 
to incoming sensory data) is systematized and expressed verbally.
Language and Conscious Experience
Bandler and Grinder assume that natural language can potentially 
represent all sensory information. They further assume that language 
will reflect the manner in which given experiences have been coded. The 
individual chooses, usually unconsciously, the particular words which 
best represent his experience. Hence, predicates (adjectives, adverbs, 
and verbs) in linguistic output correspond to the processes and rela­
tionships of experience and indicate the representational system(s) in 
which experiences have been stored. Should vital aspects of the world 
of reality not be represented in the person's conscious model of the 
world (due to generalization, deletion, and distortion having occurred 
when sensory input data was subjected to the modeling process which pro­
duced the individual's model of the world), these particular aspects of 
the real world will not be available for representation linguistically. 
This implies that an individual's verbalizations will contain words 
reflecting the functions of each sensory modality in proportion to the 
extent of his reliance upon the specific mode in representing his exper­
iences. A conceptualization of the world which has been impoverished 
through generalizations, deletions, and distortions is discoverable, 
Bandler and Grinder contend, through attention to the relative frequency 
in an individual's speech of modality specific words.
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An impoverished model of the world limits the range of behaviors 
available to an individual in response to his life situations. Lacking 
significant data about the world he cannot recognize all realistic alter­
natives. Bandler and Grinder observe that the psychological pain which 
brings an individual into psychotherapy is often due to a sensed lack of 
freedom and choice in life. This feeling can frequently be traced 
(through predicate analysis) to an impoverished model of the world 
rather than to actual constraints upon his behavior. Other people, for 
example the therapist, may recognize more available choices than does 
the client. These limitations on the range of behaviors available to 
the individual arise, then, not from the world itself, but from the rep­
resentation of the world which provides the ground rules for his mode of 
functioning therein.
The objective of psychotherapy is to increase the individual's 
options in organizing and representing his experiences so as to expand 
his model of the world and thereby increase the choices available to him 
in responding to his life situation. Natural language, as an output 
system which functions to represent conscious experience, was recognized 
by Bandler and Grinder as a potentially useful therapeutic tool by means 
of which the therapist might investigate the client's model of the 
world. While no single representational system can be considered gen­
erally better, for certain tasks and in certain situations one may be 
more efficient. Therefore, adequate development of the ability to rep­
resent within each sensory mode ensures choice by enabling one to attend 
to and utilize information arriving on all channels.
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The Meta-Model for Therapy: Roots in 
Generative Transformational Grammar
To facilitate therapeutic model expansion, Bandler and Grinder 
have focussed on the role of language in therapy. Their Meta-Model for 
Therapy systematizes the therapeutic communication process and explic­
itly delineates how language can be used to investigate and expand the 
client's model of the world. The Structure of Magic, Volume I is 
devoted specifically to an indepth consideration of language use while 
in Volume IX of the series non-verbal coimnunieation systems are examined 
within a general model of communication and change. The explicit model 
or "grammar" which they have developed describes how verbal communica­
tion functions in human interactions to either facilitate or discourage 
changer-model expansion— in the individual. Bandler and Grinder chose 
the meta-model for language to guide their construction of the Meta- 
Model for Therapy because the analysis and systematization of linguistic 
behavior far exceeds in quantity and thoroughness that of other behav­
ioral domains, for example, non-verbal communication, sensation, 
abstract thought. The linguistic model, therefore, provides a generally 
recognized and well-developed representation of the modeling process.
In developing the Meta-Model for Therapy, Bandler and Grinder 
adapted portions of the Generative Transformational Grammar (Chomsky, 
1957) because this is the most comprehensive and explicit model avail­
able today for the description of natural language. Because it plays a 
crucial role in implementation of the Meta-Model for Therapy, a brief 
overview of relevant features of transformational grammar is necessary.
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Essentially, this linguistic model provides for the derivation 
of sentences (Surface Structures), through application of a series of 
explicit rules (Transformational Rules), from the full or complete lin­
guistic representations of the meaning to be communicated (Deep Struc­
tures). This transformational process subjects the linguistic material 
at the Deep Structure level to the usual processes of model formation: 
generalization, deletion, and distortion. However, the material at the 
Deep Structure level is already the product of prior model formation 
during which experiences were represented in full linguistic form. 
Furthermore, Bandler and Grinder observe, those experiences so repre­
sented were the product of modeling taking place during selective atten­
tion to incoming sensory stimulation. Thus, when a linguistic utterance 
is produced, the potential for disparity between it and the reality 
represented is very great.
The pathway from real world data to its ultimate representation 
through the surface structures of language is portrayed in Table 1.
Table 1
Steps in the Transformation of Real World Data into Language
I. Real World Data 
(Neurological System - a Filter)
II. Sensory Input 
(Perceptual Processing - a Filter)
III. Conscious Experience
IV. Deep Structure 
(Transformations - a Filter)
V. Surface Structure
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A meta-model describes the processes of another model and, as 
such, refers to structure rather than to specific content. Accordingly, 
a linguistic grammar describes how sentences are legitimately formed in 
a language but does not concern the specific meaning conveyed by the 
sentences. Native speakers of a language consistently demonstrate cer­
tain intuitions about how their language works. This is easily seen in 
reading the poetry of Ogden Nash. While the "words" have no meaning in 
English, the sentences are nevertheless judged properly constructed and 
the parts of speech readily identified. The structural well-formedness 
of sentences is intuitively recognized: "Even the dog has fleas." is 
consistently recognized by native speakers of English as well-formed 
syntactically and semantically, "Even the dog has slimey feeling." as 
syntactically well-formed but semantically ill-formed, "Even the dog 
have fleas." as syntactically ill-formed but possibly carrying some 
meaning. As Bandler and Grinder point out, the logical-semantic rela­
tions reflected by sentences are also readily identified by native 
speakers: verbs connect or describe relationships between various kinds 
and numbers of things: "hit" implies a person hitting, a person or 
thing being hit, and an instrument used to do the hitting. Ambiguity 
and synonymy are recognized. Native speakers can determine whether a 
referential index denotes a particular object or a class of objects and 
whether two words refer to the same object. Finally, native speakers 
can determine the presuppositions underlying verbal statements. The 
generative transformational grammatical model explicitly represents all 
these native intuitions. This fact is the key to the usefulness of the 
Meta-Model for Therapy which is predicated upon the Meta-Model for
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Language. Because the native speaker (therapist) intuitively under­
stands the grammatical structure of his language, he can readily learn 
and apply the Meta-Model for Therapy as a tool for exploring the lin­
guistically represented experiences of the client.
Bandler and Grinder's Meta-Model for Therapy is analogous to the 
transformational grammarians' Meta-Model for Language: both meta-models 
describe processes without regard to content— the manner in which gram­
matically well-structured sentences are produced in a language, and the 
manner in which verbal exchange in psychotherapy functions to facilitate 
expansion of the client's model of the world. The Meta-Model for Ther­
apy entails use of the Meta-Model for Language to identify linguistic 
generalizations, deletions, and distortions. The therapist, as a native 
speaker of the language, is able to make accurate judgments regarding 
syntactic and semantic well-formedness. When generalizations, deletions, 
distortions or presuppositions are detected in the client's speech, they 
are clues to the therapist that that portion of the client's model of 
the world should be explored for possible impoverishment. The therapist 
through appropriate questioning as described in the Meta-Model for Ther­
apy can determine whether portions of the Deep Structure representation 
of experience have merely been subjected to the modeling process and 
eliminated, etc., at that level— or whether material given inadequate 
representation linguistically is, in fact, missing from the client's 
model of the world, a distorted version of reality, or inappropriately 
generalized at the level of conscious experience. The Meta-Model for 
Therapy provides a set of explicit rules which describe verbal communi­
cations recognized as well-formed in therapy: such utterances contain
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no deletions or nominalizations (processes distorted through being rep­
resented as events), no words lacking referential indices (generalized) 
or unspecified verbs, no unexplored presuppositions (which may be mis- 
founded) and no semantic ill-formedness. Implementing the Meta-Model 
for Therapy alerts the therapist to portions of the client's model of 
the world which are impoverished. The therapist can then make appropri­
ate interventions designed to provide the client with experiences which 
will attune him to information about the world from sensory channels he 
has been neglecting. Attention to these previously ignored data will 
expand his model of the world, broadening the range of behaviors avail­
able to him in response to his life situation and thereby increasing his 
sense of freedom and choice.
In summary, the Bandler and Grinder Meta-Model for Therapy is a 
systematization of the verbal communication process as it occurs between 
client and therapist in psychotherapy. The explicit rules of the Meta- 
Model for Therapy define the manner in which the therapist can use lan­
guage as a tool to explore and expand the client's model of the world.
By attending to the grammatical structure of the client's sentences—  
following the Meta-Model for Language— the therapist can identify gener­
alizations, deletions, and distortions, as well as presuppositions 
underlying the client's statements. Through appropriate questioning, he 
can then determine whether or not these sentences, in addition to being 
well-formed in English, also reflect psychological soundness.
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Implications of the Meta-Model for Therapy:
Language as Representing Sensory
Modality Preference
Bandler and Grinder believe that language productions represent 
conscious experience, that is, reflect the way the speaking individual 
has represented to himself information about the real world received 
through the various sensory channels. Words are chosen which will best 
communicate an experience. Therefore, an experience represented in a 
given sensory mode will be linguistically represented in words reflect­
ing the same mode. Consequently, the therapist can use the relative 
frequency of occurrence in the client's speech of words reflecting the 
sensory modalities as a clue to differential reliance upon the various 
modes in representing conscious experience. A client who uses many 
words specific to a given modality may be doing so as a matter of pref­
erence, or he may be restricted to that type of predicate because he is 
not attending to information available through other sensory systems.
By appropriately questioning the client, the therapist can determine 
whether generalizations, deletions, and distortions have occurred at the 
linguistic level (e.g., the client, while aware of the sights and sounds 
accompanying an experience, may choose to speak in terms of the feelings 
involved) or whether his conscious model of the world is itself impover­
ished. An impoverished model of the world is one in which material mis­
represented linguistically as a result of generalizations, deletions, 
and distortions is also misrepresented in or omitted from the client's 
conscious experience. When such misrepresentations or omissions are
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identified through application of the Meta-Model for Therapy and Meta- 
Model for Language, the therapist can provide experiences for the client 
which will expand his model of the world and provide a broader range of 
behavioral alternatives for the client in his life situation. This is 
the objective of psychotherapy as conceptualized by Bandler and Grinder.
The Meta-Model for Therapy, as presented by Bandler and Grinder, 
carries some interesting implications regarding man's perception and 
understanding of the world, the possibility for psychotherapeutic change 
in this perception and understanding, and the means by which such change 
might be achieved.
The assumption that the physically intact human is equally cap­
able of representing experiences in all sensory modalities but tends to 
favor some mode(s) over others implies that perception is learned and 
therefore subject to modification through deliberate development of the 
ability to represent in relatively neglected modes. If the psycho­
therapist can identify such neglected modes through examination of the 
client's speech, then he can, with relative ease, increase the potency 
of his psychotherapeutic approach. Once the impoverished portions of 
the client's model of the world have been identified, the therapist can 
quickly focus on the source of impoverishment: faulty processing of 
sensory data provided through some channel(s). Therapeutic interven­
tions can be deliberately chosen to facilitate the client's learning to 
make use of additional data about the world which the previously 
neglected modality offers.
The Meta-Model for Therapy suggests both inter- and intra­
individual differences in relative development of representational
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a b i l i t y  in each sensory mode. Although psychopathological groups may 
show more extreme disregard of information carr ied  by some mode(s ) , 
in t ra - ind iv idua l  d i f fe rences  in preferred mode would be expected to be 
charac te r is t ic  of the normal as w e l l  as the psychopathological popula­
tion.  Equally high development of representat ional a b i l i t y  with in a l l  
modes would be idea l ,  permitt ing the indiv idual to u t i l i z e  a l l  ava i lab le  
information about his world. One might expect to f ind,  in the normal 
population, pr imarily  indiv iduals  exh ib i t ing  moderate d i f fe rences  in 
development of  representat ional  a b i l i t y  across modes. Bandler and 
Grinder assert that in his more well -developed representat ional 
system(s) the ind iv idual  experiences imagery which is correspondingly 
more v i v i d .  In the normal population, then, one would expect to f ind 
moderate in t ra - in d iv idua l  d i f fe rences  in v iv idness o f  imagery across 
modes r e f l e c t in g  d i f f e r e n t i a l  development of  representat ional a b i l i t y .  
Sensory modality pre ference and imagery are, then, two areas in which i t  
is  important to examine the a va i lab le  evidence.
Evidence of Sensory Modality Pre ference
Do indiv iduals  ac tua l ly  demonstrate preferences for  some sensory 
mode(s) over others as sources of  information about their  worlds? Many 
animal species are character ized by exceptional  development of  a par­
t icu la r  sensory system due to i t s  evo lut ion as a primary surv iva l  mech­
anism. To what extent then are in t ra - ind iv idua l  sensory modality p r e f ­
erences a t t r ibu tab le  to the structure of the nervous system i t s e l f  and 
to what extent is  m o d i f i a b i l i t y  evident? M o d i f i a b i l i t y  w ith in  the sen­
sory systems would lead to d i f fe rences  between indiv iduals  in patterns
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of relative sensory dominances as well as to intra-individual sensory 
modality preferences.
While there is considerable empirical evidence supporting inter­
individual differences in general sensitivity to incoming stimulation, 
modality preferences per se have less frequently been the object of 
investigation. Consequently, little direct evidence exists supporting 
intra-individual differences in relative sensitivity to information 
arriving over the various sensory channels. Assessment of sensitivity 
to stimulation has generally focussed on functioning within a single 
sensory modality, usually kinesthetic or visual. Measurement techniques 
have varied widely, including performance on after-effects tasks, 
electroencephalography, pain tolerance, reaction time tasks, autonomic 
perception, respiration patterns, etc. The relevance of these measures 
to the present study inheres in the similarity between the process of 
deleting from experience real world data which is available through the 
sensory systems, as described by Bandler and Grinder, and the differ­
ential sensitivity towards sensory stimulation which individuals have 
shown when such measures have been applied. In some cases imagery 
ability was incorporated as a measure of sensitivity to stimulation; 
however, studies designed specifically to explore differences in imagery 
ability will be reviewed in the section on imagery literature to follow.
After-effects tasks have been used in studies designed to 
investigate inter- and intra-individual differences in the tendency to 
perceive a stimulus as increased or decreased along some dimension fol­
lowing prolonged prior stimulation by a relevant stimulus in the same 
modality. While inter-individual differences in degree of after-effects
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has been known for  some time (Kohler & Dinnerstein, c i ted  in Barnes,
1976; Kohler & Wallach, 1944) evidence of  inter-sensory d i f fe rences  
within indiv iduals  is more tenuous. P o s i t i v e  c o r re la t ion  has been found 
for  v isua l  and k inesthet ic  a f t e r - e f f e c t s  (J a f f e ,  1956; Landauer, Singer 
& Day, 1966; Wertheimer & Wertheimer, 1954) and lias been postulated as a 
general ch a rac te r is t ic  (Eysenck, 1955; Kle in  & Krecli, 1952). Other 
studies have found no s ign i f i c a n t  cor re la t ion  in s i z e  of a f t e r - e f f e c t s  
in these two modes (Day, Burns, Singer, Holmes & Letcher, 1967; McEwen 
& Rodger, 1960; Spitz  & Lipman, 1960). Numerous theories have been 
developed to explain the phenomenon and both phys io log ica l  and behav­
i o r a l  measures have been u t i l i z e d .  For example, metabolic e f f i c i e n c y  
and performance on react ion time tasks have been l inked to s i z e  of 
a f t e r - e f f e c t s  (Wertheimer, 1955).
A general theory of  ind iv idual  d i f fe rences  in stimulus in tens i ty  
modulation which appeared r e l a t i v e l y  recent ly  as a resu l t  o f  studies in 
s e n s i t i v i t y  to pain (P e t r i e ,  1967) proposes that i t  is  possible  to d i f ­
f e r e n t ia t e  between sensory augmenters, reducers, and moderates in the 
non-pathological adult population on the basis of  performance on the 
K inesthet ic  Figural A f t e r -E f f e c t s  Task (KFA). When estimating the s i z e  
of  a stimulus object  by touch fo l low ing  st imulation by a s im i lar  but 
d i f f e r e n t  s ized stimulus, Augmenters t y p i ca l l y  overestimate the s i z e  
while  Reducers underestimate i t  and Moderates show no substant ia l  d ev i ­
ation in e i ther  d i rec t ion .  Although evidence is mixed, a recent review 
of research in the area of  ind iv idual  d i f fe rences  in perceptual reac­
tance (Barnes, 1976) o f f e r s  support for  the concept of  a centra l  stimu­
lus in tens i ty  contro l  mechanism whereby the strength of incoming sensory
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data is  modulated by the ind iv idual .  Most studies invest igated  a f t e r ­
e f f e c t s  using the KFA task (H ilgard,  Morgan & Prytulak, 1968; Mishara, 
Baker, Parker & Kostin, 1973; Weintraub, Green & Herzog, 1973). The 
Augmentation-Reduction dimension, however, is  supported by a v a r i e t y  of 
measures: Reducers demonstrate higher pain to lerance than Augmenters
(P e t r i e ,  Co l l ins  & Solomon, 1960; Poser, c i ted  in Barnes, 1976; Sweeney, 
1966); a th le t i c s  pa r t i c ipa t ion  (Ryan & Foster, 1967; Ryan & Kovacik, 
1966). Contact a th le tes  in the l a t t e r  study d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from 
other subjects in KFA scores as w e l l ,  c l e a r l y  supporting P e t r i e ' s  prono- 
s i t i o n  that while  some indiv iduals  heighten the ir  perception of  environ­
mental stimulat ion, others attenuate i t .  Other measures include the 
MMP1 Hypochondriasis Scale (Vando, 1969) where Augmenters score higher 
than Reducers; des i re  fo r  intense versus subdued sensory input (Sales,  
1971, 1972); Vando's Reducer-Augmenter forced-choice  questionnaire with 
items r e f l e c t in g  a l l  f i v e  sensory modal it ies  and paired to contrast in 
in tens i ty  of stimulat ion has success fu l ly  discriminated high- from low- 
problem crew members in a bioastronaut i s o la t io n  experiment (Rockwell,  
Hodgson, Beljan & Chapman, 1974).
S e n s i t i v i t y  to autonomic responses has a lso been used to d i f ­
f e r e n t ia t e  between indiv iduals  ( Ikeda 6 H ira i ,  1976; Mandler, Handler & 
U v i l l e r ,  1958). The measures used included heartrate ,  psycho-galvanic 
skin response, r esp i ra t ion ,  face temperatures, and blood volume. A s i g ­
n i f i can t  c o r re la t ion  between KFA task scores and "strength  o f  the ner­
vous system" index further supports the Augmenter-Reducer dimension 
(Sales & Throop, 1972). As described by Gray (c i t ed  in Barnes, 1976), 
this type of  index r e f l e c t s  working capaci ty of cerebra l c e l l s .  Many
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studies have examined the average evoked responses (AER's) o f  Augmenters 
and Reducers and found d i f f e r e n t i a l  amplitudes and la tenc ies  (Buchsbaum 
& Pfefferbaum, 1971; Buchsbaum & Silverman, 1968; Silverman, Buchsbaum & 
Henlcin, 1969). In the Buchsbaum and Silverman study KFA scores were 
found to co r re la te  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  with the latency and amplitude 
measures.
There is  evidence from experiments using c o n f l i c t  s i tuat ions  and 
react ion time tasks that v i s i o n  is  prepotent over other sensory modali­
t i e s .  Colav ita  (1974) presented subjects with simultaneous auditory and 
v isua l  s timuli  matched f o r  sub jec t ive  magnitude. Subjects responded to 
the v isua l  stimulus and frequent ly  were not even aware that the auditory 
stimulus also had been present. Posner, Nissen and Kle in (1976) imply a 
learning fac tor  when they suggest that th is  dominance of v i s ion  over the 
other modali t ies  is  due to the reduced a l e r t in g  a b i l i t y  of  v isua l  input 
and hence greater  at tent ion  given by indiv iduals  to v isua l  information. 
Pick, Warren and Hay (1969) found in a l o c a l i z a t i o n  task in which sub­
j e c t s  were given discrepant information from two sense modal i t ies  that 
v i s ion  biased proprioception and auditory judgments and that proprio­
cept ion biased auditory judgments but had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on v isual  judg­
ments. Warren and Cleaves (1971) found greater  v isua l  bias when d is ­
crepancy with k inesthet ic  information was smaller. Canon (1970) and 
Kelso, Cook, Olson and Epstein (1975) manipulating subjects '  a t tent ion 
in c o n f l i c t  tasks found that the unattended modality is  reca l ib ra ted  and 
that this tends to be kinesthesis  rather than v is ion  because of  the ten­
dency to attend to v i s ion  in the absence of  some incent ive  to do other­
wise. The components of  a t ten t ion  have been described by Posner and
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Boies (1971) as alertness, information selection, and limited central 
processing capacity. Determination of sensory modality dominance is a 
complex problem. To date evidence of intra-individual differences in 
modality preferences is insufficient, as is evidence of a biologically 
given hierarchy of sensory dominance. Research .described above does 
support differences between individuals' sensitivity to stimulation 
within various modalities and in some cases between pairs of modalities, 
but fails to compare the same individuals across all modalities.
Research using imagery as a measure of modality preference, however, has 
focussed on individual differences in imaging ability across modalities 
(Brower, 1947a; Lindauer, 1969). Results support both inter-individual 
differences in general imaging ability and also intra-individual dif­
ferences in the pattern of dominances among the sensory modalities. 
Because an imagery measure is incorporated as a vital part of this 
study, it will be appropriate to survey the development of imagery 
research and findings which support its use as a measure of sensory 
modality preference.
, Mental Imagery
Imagery research has had a long and erratic history, gaining, 
losing, and regaining status as a legitimate field for scientific 
investigation. A brief review of this history follows. Imaging ability 
has been related to human functioning in many areas, revealing inter- 
and intra-individual differences in pattern of sensory modality prefer­
ences. Measurement techniques used to assess imagery ability will be 
described, with particular attention given the Betts (1909) Questionnaire
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Upon Mental Imagery (QMI), a shortened vers ion of  which was administered 
as part o f  the present study.
History of  Imagery Research:
Indiv idual Di f fe rences
Imaging a b i l i t y  was recognized to f a c i l i t a t e  memory functioning 
as long ago as the years B.C. Bugelski (1970) r e la te s  the p r inc ip le  of 
Loci  et Res (p laces and things) which was described in an anonymous 
manuscript o f  about 55 B£. instruct ing  Cicero in the art  of  memory. The 
mnemonic method instructed the orator  to r e l a t e  images of  things to be 
remembered and to r e la t e  these images to fam i l ia r  locat ions .  Taking a 
mental s t r o l l  through the area the imaged items emerged as reminders of  
points to be made in the speech. This ear ly  appreciation for  and use of 
imagery is  r e f l e c ted  in the prominence accorded images in the beginnings 
of experimental psychology (Fechner, c i ted  in Boring, 1957; Galton,
1880). During the 1890's s c i en t i s t s ,  e . g . ,  Wundt and his student 
T itchener,  were seeking to understand the mind, i t s  contents and laws 
governing the assoc iat ion o f  these elements. Through introspect ion,  
consciousness was explored and the component elements were id e n t i f i e d  as 
images. Indiv idual d i f fe rences  in imagery were the object of  much 
inves t iga t ion .  This was a period of r e sp e c ta b i l i t y  and status for  the 
image.
In the ear ly  1900's ,  however, imagery's eventual f a l l  from s c i ­
e n t i f i c  grace was prec ip i ta ted  by a se r ies  o f  experiments done at Wurz­
burg by Kiilpe and his assoc iates (Boring, 1957) . These inves t iga tors  
discovered that contrary to Wundt's basic assumption not a l l  thought 
processes were characterized by imaginal experiences. Subjects asked to
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solve problems and describe their concurrent mental activities through 
introspection were unable to produce sufficient explanations of associ­
ative thinking. It seemed, rather, that unconscious processes not 
involving imaginal experience were occurring. Introspection as an 
investigatory technique focussing on conscious elements of thought thus 
lost its utility and respectability. Killpe's "school of imageless 
thought" arose as a result of these findings and opened the door for the 
objective, operational methods of Watson's Behaviorism. And out this 
door Behaviorism cast imagery, along with concern for consciousness and 
thought. Imagery remained a pariah to psychologists until recent years. 
A few lengthy reviews of the status of imagery research at the time do 
appear in the literature (Angell, 1910; Davis, 1932; Griffitts, 1927).
During the past twenty-five years the study of imagery has been 
gradually regaining its lost prestige. This re-emergence of imagery 
into the scientific arena is attributable primarily to factors outside 
psychology. Holt (1964) notes a wide range of contributory conditions 
which caused attention to be redirected back to the nature of imagery 
and its role in human cognitive functioning. Radar operators, long­
distance drivers, jet pilots, polar explorers and others driving vehi­
cles in snowstorms, astronauts and future cosmonauts all face practical 
problems at the occurrence of vivid imagery which often is mistaken for 
reality and results in serious accidents. Persons subjected to pro­
longed isolation or sensory deprivation, hallucinogenic drugs, those 
suffering from schizophrenia and under some conditions normal persons 
also experience unusual imaginal phenomena. Brain research involving 
electroencephalography, direct brain stimulation, and work on the
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r e t i cu la r  ac t iva t ing  system and dreams, as w e l l  as cases o f  brain trauma 
and epilepsy provided important data which rev ived in teres t  in  imagery. 
Cognit ive  research, studies on c r e a t i v i t y  and the e f f e c t s  of  marginal 
and subliminal s t imul i  have served a s imi lar  function.
Psychology is  now re - inves t ing  i t s  e f f o r t s  into the imagery area 
— this time de f in ing  the image not in menta l is t ic  terms, but in  ways more 
acceptable to the ob je c t i v e  American psycholog ist .  For example, imaginal 
experiences are considered a r eac t iva t ion  of  former sensory or perceptual 
a c t i v i t y .  A harbinger of  this rennaisance o f  imagery research, Leuba 
(1940) described images as conditioned sensations. He'ob ( c i t ed  in Bugel- 
ski,  1970) considers images to be rev ived c e l l  assemblies— perceptual 
processes occurring in the absence of stimulation normally producing the 
percept ion (Hebb, 1966). Neisser (1976) b e l i eves  that images are sche­
mata detached from the perceptual cyc le  described e a r l i e r ,  and occur in 
the absence of new information pick-up. They r e f l e c t  a readiness to 
perce ive  the imagined ob jec t— an ant ic ipa tory  phase of perception,  not 
reproductions o f  e a r l i e r  "percepts " .  Mnemonics have reappeared as medi­
ator in paired assoc iate  learning experiments (Pa iv io ,  1969). These 
developments have drawn increased a t ten t ion  to the discovery of in d iv id ­
ual d i f fe rences  in the r o le  of  conscious imagery, the r e la t ion  of  imag­
ery to other human funct ions,  and p ro f i t a b le  inves t iga tory  techniques.
I ndividual D i f ferences  and the Betts 
Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery
One of  the e a r l i e s t  inves t iga tors  into ind iv idua l  d i f fe r ences  in 
imaging a b i l i t y  was Galton (1880, 1883). Galton was in terested  in the 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  inheritance o f  mental f a c u l t i e s .  His famous Breakfast
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Table Questionnary explored Individual differences in the illumination, 
definition, and coloring of voluntary memory imagery (visual) in English 
males who were asked to produce a visual image of their recent breakfast 
table scene and to judge the vividness, etc., thereof. He found that 
while scientists tended not to image visually, the great majority of the 
general population did. He attributed this difference to development of 
abstract thought and the consequent loss or subordination of visual 
imagery. In a critical review of Galton's work, Bain (1880) observed 
that the Breakfast Table method was too narrow because vividness of 
imagery is affected by many things. It would be better, Bain suggested, 
to have subjects image a number of objects under various conditions. He 
believed the quality of the image to be dependent on the quality of the 
original sensation and that visual imagery had to conform to a sensory 
base (e.g., color, form). He also suggested that language use should be 
compared with imagery and the original sensations, raising the question 
as to whether low visualizers tended to use other modalities or language 
instead. He agreed with Galton that imagery ability is lost through 
disuse, subordination and age.
Following Galton's style, early imagery research relied on the 
method of introspection to assess imagery ability. Interest developed 
in the relative strengths of verbal versus visual imagery and led to a 
search from about 1880 to 1910 for "pure types"— people characterized as 
audiles, visiles, tactiles, etc. Type was conceptualized as a prefer­
ence for one sensory mode to the exclusion of all others. Everyone was 
assumed to belong to some type and any test was considered adequate to 
determine what type that was. Around 1910 the search for types began to
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focus on behavioral cor re la tes  of imagery as inves t iga tors  began to 
r e la t e  d i f fe rences  in type to other ind iv idual  d i f fe rences  and to use 
ob je c t i v e  measures in addit ion to the sub ject ive  in t rospec t ive  tech­
nique. Subjects were f requent ly  presented with tasks believed to be 
highly re la ted  to a s p e c i f i c  modality. To the surpr ise o f  researchers, 
no pure types were found. However, in t e r -  and in t ra - ind iv idua l  d i f f e r ­
ences were observed in the r e l a t i v e .ease with which the tasks were com­
pleted.  llow we l l  an indiv idual  performed on a modality s p e c i f i c  task 
was then thought to r e f l e c t  the development o f  that par t icu lar  sensory 
modality. Normal indiv iduals  genera l ly  were found to experience a l l  
kinds of  imagery and frequent ly  were characterized d i f f e r e n t l y  by d i f ­
fe rent  tes ts .  For most people, v isua l  imagery was predominant and most 
verbal, imagery reported was of the auditory-motor type. The imagery 
research area was becoming more complex and th is  trend continues today. 
Thorndike (c i t ed  in Fernald, 1912) contended that there were, in f a c t ,  
no types at a l l ,  that everyone belonged to the same type, mediocre, or 
e lse  that everyone had his own type because d is t r ibu t ion  curves of 
scores were not multi-modal. Sega l 's  (c i t ed  in Fernald, 1912) argument 
was that types depend not on frequency or c l a r i t y  o f  imagery but rather 
on exceeding the average for  the group. A subject would be c l a s s i f i e d  
as, fo r  example, k inesthet ic  on the basis of  only 18% k inesthet ic  
responses i f  this were greater  than the group average, even though he 
may have had 54% v isua l  and 29% auditory responses. Fernald (1912) 
espoused the concept of  predominance among modal i t ies  on the grounds 
that while  indiv iduals  seemed to u t i l i z e  more than one image form, they
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exhibited marked d i f fe rences  in emphasis. Others spoke of  combination 
types as character iz ing  groups.
During this period and into the present, the methods used in 
imagery research have been c l a s s i f i e d  as e i ther  " su b je c t i v e "  or "ob je c ­
t i v e " ,  with both types being used in most studies. The former is l im­
i ted  to purely in t rospec t ive  judgments by the subject as to the nature 
of  his imaginal experience. The l a t t e r  is  l imited to a behavioral mea­
sure taken to represent imaginal experience. The co r re la t ion  of  in t ro ­
spect ive  s e l f - r ep o r t  with observable behavior, genera l ly  performance on 
some problem-solving task, has characterized imagery research ever since 
inves t iga tors  f i r s t  ventured beyond the purely in t rospec t iv e  account and 
questionnaire stage (Barratt ,  1953; Brower, 1947b; Chowdhury & Vernon, 
1964; Danaher & Thoresen, 1972; DiVesta, Ingerso l l  & Sunshine, 1971; 
Richardson, 1977; Start  & Richardson, 1964). The search for  types with 
i t s  impl icat ion o f  ind iv idual  d i f fe r ences  in performance as w e l l  as in 
reported imaginal experience led to a search f o r  v a l id  behavioral mea­
sures which might rep lace s e l f - r e p o r t s .  Consequently, various tasks 
were presented subjects under the reasoning that they should be ind ica­
t i v e  of favored imagery modali t ies  and s e l f - r e p o r t  measures were taken 
to check up on task performance. The concern was with standardization 
of  research methods and th is  ear ly  stage was f i l l e d  with tremendous 
quant i t ies  of tests  witli l i t t l e  support fo r  the ir  use as measures of 
imagery modality pre ference. Today evidence is  slowly accruing and, 
while  s t i l l  ind i r ec t ,  appears to support a re la t ionsh ip  between imagery 
and sensory modality pre ference in addit ion to the preferences shown by 
indiv iduals  fo r  par t icu lar  modali t ies  in  these two areas of  functioning.
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There is  also some evidence supporting a re la t ionsh ip  between imagery 
use and phys io log ica l  measures such as blocking of alpha rhythms (Bar- 
r a t t ,  1956; Golla , Hutton & Walter, c i ted  in Barratt,  1956; Simpson, 
Pa iv io  & Rogers, 1967 ; S la t te r ,  1960) and resp iratory  patterns during 
performance of  tasks during which imagery is used (Short, 1953).
Early studies of sub jec t ive  imagery experiences which used the 
in t rospec t ive  method tended to focus primarily  on v isua l  imagery and 
e ither  ignored functioning in the other senses or f a i l e d  to adequately 
sample a l l  modes. Betts developed a Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery 
(1909) which corrected this d e f i c i t .  In a se r ies  of s ix teen studies, 
voluntary and spontaneous use of  imagery in thought was explored through 
subjects '  in t rospec t ive  judgments as to the clearness and v iv idness of 
imaginal experiences in response to 150 d esc r ip t iv e  phrases representing 
sensory experiences u t i l i z i n g  each o f  seven modal i t ies :  auditory, 
v isua l ,  k inesthet ic ,  o l f a c to ry ,  gustatory,  organic,,  cutaneous. Results 
showed a decrease of  imagery with age and abstract  thought, indiv idual  
d i f fe rences  in c l a r i t y  and v iv idness and even d is t r ibu t ion  among modal­
i t y  types. Betts concluded that although people are s e l e c t i v e  about the 
use o f  imagery types in thought, no natural d i f fe rences  in strengtli of 
the various modes ex is ts .  P rac t ice ,  he thought, could keep a l l  modes 
equally w e l l  developed as they appear to be in the voluntary imagery 
measured by the QMI. Imagery pre ference was not necessari ly  re la ted  to 
mental content in his estimation; the cor re la t ion  between imagery and 
academic performance was s l i g h t l y  negat ive and no re la t ionsh ip  was found 
with academic area or a b i l i t y .  According to Betts, even i f  able to 
image vo lu n ta r i l y ,  one may not use imagery during spontaneous thought.
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It is possible that images could be by-products of thought— not an 
integral part of the process.
The original 150-item version of the Betts QMI, requiring 
approximately one hour administration time, was of limited usefulness in 
imagery research. Sheehan (1967a) undertook to condense the QMI into a 
35-item version which would discriminate as well as the longer form.
The original QMI was administered to 280 Australian undergraduates and 
Betts' findings of individual differences in clarity and vividness of 
imagery were confirmed. Imagery was not exclusive to particular modes 
and few subjects were unable to image at will. Item intercorrelations 
within each modality were factor analyzed and five items representing 
each sensory modality were chosen (total 35 items). A single factor 
accounted for the variance of scores within each mode. The items chosen 
loaded highly on this main component for each modality. The shortened 
form was then administered to sixty new subjects and results were factor 
analyzed. A major component (general imaging ability) was found and 
minor components which were specific to modalities. Total scores based 
on the original form and the shortened form of the questionnaire corre­
lated .92. This finding was replicated with data from another sample 
where the two forms were correlated at .98. The shortened version, 
requiring only about ten minutes administration time, has been shown to 
reliably differentiate subjects in imagery ability as well as the ori­
ginal version of the questionnaire, thus proving a useful and more con­
venient tool for imagery research. This short form has also been found 
reliable and suitable for use with American subjects (Sheehan, 1967b).
Statement of the Problem
Bandler and Grinder have suggested that the language man uses to 
express himself directly reflects his experience of reality. That is, 
words appearing in spontaneous speech reveal the speaker's relative reli­
ance on the various sensory modalities for information about the exter­
nal world. Bandler and Grinder have assumed, and assert, that a direct 
relationship exists between language and sensory experience: they pro­
pose that man chooses unconsciously words to represent his experiences 
which most aptly suit those experiences, matching the sensory modality 
in which an experience is represented in his conscious model of the 
world.
If the Bandler-Grinder theory is correct, it has some important 
implications for the areas of education and psychotherapy. It would be 
possible on the basis of the postulated relationship between language 
and experience, to deliberately structure educational systems and tech­
niques to enhance the learning process for individual students. Edu­
cators would be able to take advantage of both their students' expressed 
sensory modality preferences and to expand these to include sensory 
modalities of presently limited development. Learning theorists would 
need to incorporate modality specificity into their model, increasing 
its complexity but its effectiveness when applied as well. In the area 
of psychotherapy, attention to language use would facilitate the thera­
peutic process, particularly in the practice of hypnosis and systematic 
desensitization. Outside the therapeutic context, ordinary interperson­
al interactions could be significantly improved.
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This study addressed the relationship between experience and 
language use in order to determine whether frequency of modality spe­
cific predicates occurring in speech reflect the sensory nature of the 
speaker's experience. Given that vividness of imagery in the various 
sensory modes is believed by Bandler and Grinder to correspond with the 
degree to which the respective modalities have been developed as repre­
sentational systems, sensory modality preference was operationally 
defined as vividness of imagery. A review of imagery research reveals 
that among the variety of subjective and behavioral measures which have 
been used in investigations of individual differences in imagery, 
introspective self-report has remained indispensible. No behavioral 
measure has been found to replace the subjectivity of this technique. 
The Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery is the most frequently 
used measure of imagery vividness and it provides scores for each sen­
sory modality in addition to a general score. Subjects completed the 
QMI and provided samples of their speech by describing three vivid, 
personal experiences. It was hypothesized that frequency of sensory 
modality specific predicates in the speech samples would correlate pos­




Subjects for this study were 42 undergraduate psychology stu­
dents from the University of North Dakota. Of these, 22 were male and 
20 female. Subjects volunteered to participate in the study in order to 
receive research credit in the psychology course in which they were 
enrolled.
Materials and Equipment
The Sheehan 1967 Shortened Form of Betts' (1909) Questionnaire 
Upon Mental Imagery (QMI) was used. This test consists of 35 items, 
five representative of each of seven sensory modalities: visual, audi­
tory, tactual, kinesthetic, gustatory, olfactory, and organic. Each 
item is presented in the form of a word or short phrase describing an 
experience specific to the particular mode, such as "the sun as it is 
sinking below the horizon" (visual), "the mewing of a cat" (auditory), 
"the prick of a pin" (tactual), etc. Written instructions direct the 
subject to concentrate upon each item in turn, carefully considering the 
image brought to his mind's eye, ear, etc., and to rate the vividness 
and clarity of that image on a seven-point scale. The scale ranges 
from (1) Perfectly Clear and as Vivid as the Actual Experience . . . 
through (3) Moderately Clear and Vivid . . .  to (7) No Image Present at
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all, You only "Knowing" that You are Thinking of the Object. The Ques­
tionnaire format includes a cover sheet providing instructions to the 
subject, rating scale, and one sample test item. Each of the following 
seven pages contains directions specifically for the five items appear­
ing on that page; for example,' "Think of smelling each of the following, 
considering carefully the image which comes to your mind's nose and 
classify the images suggested by each of the following questions as 
indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the 
Rating Scale". The Rating Scale also appears on each page for reference 
during completion of each set of items. Ratings are recorded directly 
on each page of the booklet. All items relevant to a given sense modal­
ity appear on the same page. This format, along with directions not to 
look back at completed pages, encourages the independent rating of 
images in each mode.
Norelco equipment for dictation (Model #0085/54) and transcrib­
ing (Model #0086) were used in obtaining the language samples.
Procedure
The study was conducted in three parts: Part I, administration 
of the imagery questionnaire, Part II, procurement of the language sam­
ples, Part III, interviews to ascertain modality reference of unspeci­
fied and ambiguous predicates from the language samples.
In Part I, the Shortened Form of the Betts' Questionnaire Upon 
Mental Imagery was group-administered to volunteers during recitation 
sections accompanying the Introductory Psychology course. Size of the 
groups ranged from 5 to 25 individuals. Research credit was given for
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completion of the QMI and participants willing to continue with the 
study for additional research credit in their course indicated so on 
their test booklets.
The experimenter read the Instructions aloud to the subjects as 
they read along on the cover sheet of their test booklets. The seven 
categories of the Rating Scale were delineated, the sample test item 
presented, and any procedural questions answered. Subjects were urged 
to take their time and to concentrate while considering each item.
Total administration time was approximately twenty minutes.
Completed questionnaires were number-rcoded and a list formulated 
of the 51 subjects volunteering to continue with the experiment. These 
persons were telephoned and individual appointments arranged for their 
participation in Part II of the study. The QMI forms were not scored 
until after collection and scoring of the language samples so as not to 
bias language sample scoring through prior knowledge of subjects' dif­
ferential imagery ability in the various sensory modalities.
Part II of the study consisted of individual sessions scheduled 
for half an hour during which a sample of the subject's speech was 
obtained by the experimenter. The actual length of the individual ses­
sions varied from about ten to thirty minutes due to individual vari­
ability in quantity of spontaneous verbal output. Each subject was 
asked to relate three particularly vivid personal experiences. Subjects 
spoke into the dictation recorder which they held in their hand and were 
told that the experimenter would listen but would not converse with them. 
The specific instructions given by the experimenter were:
In this part of the study we are investigating similarities and 
differences between people in the kinds of experiences that they
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find especially vivid. At this point in the study we are particu­
larly interested in the experiences of University of North Dakota 
college students.
I am going to ask you to tell me about three experiences you 
have had that were very vivid for you. I want you to imagine your­
self having the experience right now and to describe it to me in as 
much detail as possible so that we will be able to compare your 
vivid experiences with those of the other subjects in this study.
I am going to tape-record what you tell 'me— so you must speak 
clearly and not too fast. I will listen to what you say, but I will 
not be able to speak to you while you are telling me about an 
experience.
Do you understand? Okay. I will give you a minute to think now. 
(@ 1 minute) Now, just speak directly into this little machine here 
— you can hold it in your hand like this.
First, imagine some experience you have had that was very vivid 
for you. Imagine it just as though you were now having that experi­
ence. Tell me all about it.
These instructions were amplified as necessary when subjects expressed 
confusion or difficulty in responding. Amplification was limited to 
unspecified, open-ended statements such as, "Any kind of an experience 
will do. It doesn't have to be something important. You know how some­
times you are just more aware than usual about what is happening. It 
just seems especially real and vivid. It could be anything at all. . .
. " When the subject indicated that the description was completed, the 
experimenter continued instructions as follows:
Now tell me all about something you like very much. Everything 
you like about it. Imagine it as something you are experiencing 
right now and describe it to me.
When this description was finished, the experimenter requested the third 
and final description:
You have just told me about something you like, now tell me all 
about something you don't like— everything about it that you don't 
like. Imagine it as something you are experiencing right now and 
describe it to me.
At the conclusion of this session subjects were thanked for their coop­
eration and a second individual appointment was scheduled for completion
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of Part III of the study. Of the 51 volunteers, 42 actually completed 
Part II of the study.
Prior to the final meeting, the tape-recording of each subject's 
speech was transcribed by the experimenter. The transcripts were then 
examined for predicate content and unambiguously implied sensory modali­
ties were noted. Predicates unspecified as to modality or ambiguous 
were underlined for clarification during the final interview.
Part III of the study consisted of a final half hour (range 10 
to 90 minutes) individual interview with each subject during which the 
experimenter sought to ascertain the modality reference of the subject's 
unspecified or ambiguous predicates. The experimenter began the session 
by saying:
It is very important to the study that I understand exactly how 
you experienced some of the things you described for me last time.
In some cases it may seem perfectly obvious to you, but I need to be 
certain that I understand exactly what it was like for you. For 
example, last time you said " . . . " How exactly were you aware 
of that?
The experimenter refrained from using specified predicates in the formu­
lation of questions put to the subject while seeking this information, 
in order to avoid prejudicing subjects' responses in favor of any given 
type. Unspecified questions posed by the experimenter during this 
interview included, for example, "How did you experience that?" "What 
was that like for you?" and "How did you know that?" On the basis of 
the additional information thus obtained, the experimenter determined 
the modality reference of unspecified predicates, continuing to question 
the subject until the experience was described through use of modality 
specific words or until it became evident that the subject was unable to 
provide this information. At the conclusion of the final interview,
each subject was thanked by the experimenter for participating in the 
study and was given a research credit card. In addition, names and 
addresses of all subjects were obtained and each was subsequently mailed 






Each subject ultimately obtained 25 scores: a vividness of 
imagery score for each of five modalities and a score representing the 
frequency with which specifiable predicates of each modality type 
occurred in his total language sample, as well as in each of the three 
language sub-samples.
Betts QMI
Scoring of the QMI was relatively straightforward. This measure 
yields a general vividness of imagery score which is the average of the 
35 rankings made by the subject. In addition, each set of five items 
representing the various sensory modalities when averaged yields a 
vividness of imagery score for each of seven senses: auditory, visual, 
kinesthetic, organic, gustatory, tactual, and olfactory. Because the 
kinesthetic, organic, and tactual categories appear contributory to the 
kinesthetic modality as conceptualized by Bandler and Grinder, these 
three QMI scores were combined and an average kinesthetic-organic- 
tactual score obtained to represent what hereafter is termed the kines­
thetic mode. This resulted in a series of five average vividness of 
imagery scores representing five modalities for each subject. These 
scores are provided in Appendix A.
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It was necessary, within subjects, to convert into z-score form 
the average vividness of imagery scores for each mode. This conversion 
of QMI scores into standardized form controlled for individual differ­
ences in general imaging ability and the tendency to give consistently 
elevated/depressed ratings. Thus, z-scores reflect the individual sub­
ject's vividness of imagery in each mode relative to the other modes and 
make the scores of all subjects comparable. For ease of entry into the 
computer, all z-scores were then transformed into T scores (mean = 50, 
S.D. = 10). This process necessitated rounding z-scores to one decimal 
place, but the effect on the relative values of the scores was minimal.
Language Productions
Scoring of the language data presented some difficulty. In 
part, this is attributable to the lack of any precedent in the litera­
ture: no studies have been published in which language use was explored
from the unique perspective of this investigation. It was, therefore, 
necessary to devise feasible methods for scoring the language samples. 
Further, it was important to find a scoring system as congruent as pos­
sible with the Bandler and Grinder Meta-Model for Therapy and recommend­
ed procedures for its implementation by the therapist. Consequently, 
three separate analyses were performed on the language data, each using 
a different set of guidelines, designed to focus on the data from 
slightly different perspectives.' The three scoring systems were desig­
nated Systems A, B, and C. One of these, Scoring System C, was ulti­
mately identified as the most appropriate for use in determining experi­
mental findings. All three language scoring systems will be described
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and discussed in the following sections prior to setting forth results 
of the study.
In calculating modality scores for the language samples, only 
specifiable predicates were considered. These were of three types: (a) 
predicates clearly implying use of a particular .sensory modality, such 
as the visual verb "see"; (b) predicates ambiguous as to modality but 
which through- questioning of the subject by the experimenter were iden­
tified as being intended as specific to one particular mode, such as the 
verb "fall" which could refer to either a sound (auditory) or an object 
(kinesthetic or visual) falling; (c) unspecified predicates such as 
"think" and "imagine" which through the subject's amplification of the 
experience using specified predicates were thereby related to a particu­
lar sensory modality. Summing specifiable predicates, each subject con­
sequently obtained five frequency scores representing the occurrence in 
his total speech sample of predicates specific to each of five modali­
ties. In addition, separate counts were taken of modality-specific 
predicates occurring within each language sub-sample, i.e., the three 
descriptions requested. In order that these language scores be compar­
able to the imagery scores, they were likewise converted to standardized 
form, preserving intra-subject variability between modes. For entry 
into the computer language sample z-scores were also transformed into T 
scores as imagery scores had been.
The language sample data consisted of 104 pages of typewritten 
(double-spaced) verbatim accounts of spontaneous verbalization produced 
in response to the three requests previously described. Transcript 
length ranged from one to six pages per subject, with an average length
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of two and one-half pages. Each transcript was scored by first noting 
modality reference above the predicates. Some of these references had 
been identified by the experimenter as clearly modality specific when 
the transcript was examined prior to the final, inquiry interview of 
Part III of the study. The remainder of the notations were made during 
that interview as a result of the experimenter's questioning of the sub­
ject or afterwards on the basis of the additional information about the 
experience acquired from the subject during the interview.
The design of this study departed significantly from the therapy 
situation in that language data were obtained in monologue form and 
inquiry by the experimenter (therapist) was delayed. The intent behind 
this procedure was to permit the experimenter to identify before 
inquiry, and thereby not to overlook, predicates— as might occur in the 
early stages of familiarity with the Meta-Model for Therapy and its 
implementation. This procedure allowed greater control over the data 
since spontaneous verbal output was in no way interfered with or guided. 
Experiences were described by subjects in what one can assume to be 
their characteristic manner. The lack of experimenter verbalization 
during description eliminated possible biasing due to inadvertent use of 
modality specific words or direction towards specific content areas.
A disadvantage of this design became immediately apparent during 
the inquiry interview when the sheer quantity of linguistic data to be 
questioned and the time limitations precluded a thorough investigation 
of the entire predicate content of each transcript. Verbal interaction 
during collection of the language sample, in addition to more nearly 
approximating the therapy situation, would also, of necessity, have per­
mitted less spontaneous speech on the part of the subject; much
in terv iew time would have been taken up with concurrent inquiry by the 
experimenter and determination of modality re ference during the sub­
j e c t ' s  descr ipt ion  o f  an experience. As a resu lt ,  i t  was necessary 
during the inquiry in terv iew to l im i t  questioning to primary predicates 
and the general nature o f  the experience being described. From this 
information as many predicates as possible  were spec i f i ed  and those 
remaining unspeci f ied were not included in the f in a l  scoring.
The need to l im i t  the inquiry process and thereby reduce the 
quantity o f  words requir ing sp ec i f i c a t ion  made a more str ingent d e f in i ­
t ion o f  "p red ica te "  necessary. The intent had been to include under 
that rubric a l l  verbs, adverbs, ad jec t iv es ,  and process nouns (nouns 
formed from verbs and r e fe r r in g  to a process rather than to an ob jec t ,  
e . g . ,  "education" from "educate " ) .  These ve rb -re la ted  process nouns can 
be id e n t i f i e d ,  say Bandler and Grinder, by trying to put them into a 
"mental wheelbarrow"— only concrete objects  can be imagined as contained 
in a wheelbarrow, processes such as "dec is ion " ,  "hope", e t c . ,  cannot.
The a l l - i n c lu s i v e  d e f in i t i o n  of  "p red ica te "  was amended to exclude sev­
era l  c lasses o f  words judged i r r e l e van t  to the purpose of  the study. 
Deleted from consideration were:
1. s ta te  o f  being verbs (he was happy)
2. aux i l ia ry  verbs ( I  have seen i t ;  I clo l i k e  you)
3. modal verbs (she may go; he ought to know th is )
4. adverbs o f  in t en s i f i c a t i o n  ( th is  idea is  more reasonable)
5. adverbs o f  time, place, degree, negation, p o s s ib i l i t y  (now, 
somewhere, almost, not, maybe)
6. ad jec t iv es  not modality re la ted  (no, th is ,  certa in ,  many)
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7. process nouns not modality related (autumn, morning, miles). 
Ultimately, then, the data to be scored contained five types of predi­
cates:
1. predicates with obvious reference to a given mode 
He looked at the picture. (visual)
He heard a loud sound. (auditory)
He felt the slap. (kinesthetic)
He smelled the perfume. (olfactory)
He tasted the bitter pill. (gustatory)
2. predicates with possible reference to more than one mode 
(ambiguous) depending on use
A heavy thud (auditory)
A heavy package (kinesthetic)
A heavy odor (olfactory)
3. predicates unspecified as to mode 
He recognized her.
He thought it over.
He remembered the incident.
He calculated the sum.
4. predicates eliminated from consideration due to irrelevance 
(see list above)
5. predicates potentially specifiable as to modality but which due 
to lack of time, subject's inability, insufficient information, etc., 
were not determinable.
Given transcripts containing the above-described information, 
scoring sheets were drawn up for each transcript. All predicates
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occurring in a given speech sample were listed under the headings Verb, 
Adjective, Adverb, Process Noun. Each word on the list was then coded 
for sensory modality reference in accordance with the information pro­
vided on the transcript, or crossed off following the guidelines 
described above. These data were then subjected to the three scoring 
systems and sums were taken for frequency of predicates in each mode.
Scoring System A. This initial scoring of language sample data 
was an attempt to implement the Bandler and Grinder system intuitively, 
in accordance with their descriptive instructions to the therapist. 
Therefore, predicates which were scored included: those obviously 
implying a modality, those implying a modality by virtue of the nature 
of their use in a sentence, those ambiguous and unspecified but deter­
mined through inquiry to be modality specific. In the case of these 
latter two predicate types, the subject frequently acknowledged multi­
modal reference. For example, when explaining how he was aware of a 
road being "washboardy", one subject replied that he could feel it as he 
drove over it and could see the ridges as well. Multi-modal predicates 
were scored for each sense modality referred to by the subject in his 
amplification of the experience. The rationale for this procedure was 
that ambiguous and unspecified words contain the potential to represent 
more than one mode and all modes referenced by the subject ought to add 
to the score representing his use of those systems. It was further rea­
soned that in the therapy situation when the therapist probes for expli­
cation of an experience he utilizes whatever information may be elicited 
from the client in trying to understand that client's particular model 
of the world. Hence, the information that the above subject was aware
of both kinesthetic and visual real world data is important. He did not 
say he heard the tires making a different sound as they passed over the 
ridges in the road although that surely was available information as 
well. This reveals something about which aspects of the world he 
attends to. Bandler and Grinder suggest that in ambiguous cases the 
nature of the underlying experience may be inferred from what one would 
need to do in order to verify the experience described. This particular 
technique was incorporated into the scoring method as well. For 
example, in the statement "They give you a bad time" the predicate 
"give" was scored Auditory because the situation described by the sub­
ject was one in which as a bank teller he received complaints about slow 
service from customers. To verify this experience one would have to 
hear the complaints. Although the application of these scoring proce­
dures approximated the therapist’s approach to his client's verbaliza­
tions, this method of evaluating the language data raised some funda­
mental questions. Scoring Systems B and C were developed in an effort 
to better confront these problems.
Scoring System B. Scoring Systems B and C were devised simul­
taneously. The intuitive evaluation of speech advocated by Bandler and 
Grinder and implemented in the initial scoring of the language data 
using Scoring System A appeared liable to faulty judgment. Further, it 
was reasoned that if language as used reflects modality preference then 
only obviously modality specific words should be considered. Additional 
information obtained from an individual does not represent spontaneous 
linguistic expression and without inquiry no listener would be able to 
determine modality reference of ambiguous and unspecified predicates
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where context provided insufficient information to do so. Therefore, it 
was decided to rescore the language data including only those predicates 
which obviously implied a single sensory modality either through being 
clearly related to the mode or through context. Predicates referring to 
more than one modality were excluded as not being directly indicative of 
modality preference. These changes constituted Scoring System B.
Scoring System C. As an amplified version of Scoring System B, 
Scoring System C was likewise applied to predicates the modality speci­
fication of which was either obvious or clearly implied by context. 
Multi-modal predicates were again excluded from consideration. Addi­
tionally, however, this scoring method included predicates the modality 
specification of which was determined as a result of information elicited 
from the subject. Thus System C increased objectivity in scoring over 
System A but also utilized information provided by the subject’s ampli­
fication of his experiences, unlike System B.
Correlations between Scoring Systems. To ascertain whether the 
three scoring systems in fact differed from each other when applied to 
the linguistic data and, if so, to aid in identifying the most appropri­
ate system to use in the statistical analysis, scores obtained under 
each system were correlated with each other. The language data were 
considered separately for each speech sub-sample and then together as a 
total speech sample. Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients 
were computed comparing each scoring system with each other scoring sys­
tem for each sensory modality within each of these four speech samples. 
This information is provided in Table 2.
Table 2
Corre la t ions between Scoring Systems A, B, C




Language Sample I :  Scoring System A .78 .97
Scoring System B .82
Language Sample I I :  Scoring System A .92 .98
Scoring System B .94
Language Sample I I I :  Scoring System A .77 .99
Scoring System B .80
Tota l  Language Sample: Scoring System A .83 .98
Scoring System B .85
VISUAL MODE Scoring Scoring
System B System C
Language Sample I :  Scoring System A .84 .97
Scoring System B .84
Language Sample I I :  Scoring System A .85 .97
Scoring System B .89
Language Sample I I I :  Scoring System A .76 .96
Scoring System B .79
Tota l  Language Sample: Scoring System A .87 .97
Scoring System B .88
KINESTHETIC MODE Scoring Scoring
System B System C
Language Sample I :  Scoring System A .77 .97
Scoring System B .81
Language Sample I I :  Scoring System A .70 .94
Scoring System B .30
Language Sample I I I :  Scoring System A .67 .98
Scoring System B .73
Tota l Language Sample: Scoring System A .89 .94
Scoring System B .90
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Table 2— Continued




Language Sample I: Scoring System A .72 .94
Scoring System B .74
Language Sample II: Scoring System A .82 .90
Scoring System B .70
Language Sample III: Scoring System A .73 .95
Scoring System B .73
Total Language Sample l Scoring System A .76 .88
Scoring System B .80
GUSTATORY MODE Scoring Scoring
System B System C
Language Sample I: Scoring System A .89 .98
Scoring System B .89
Language Sample II: Scoring System A .85 .98
Scoring System B .85
Language Sample III: Scoring System A .93 .95
Scoring System B .90
Total Language Sample : Scoring System A .77 .92
Scoring System B .74
As can be seen in Table 2, the highest correlation in all cases
occurred between Scoring System A and Scoring System C (range, .88 to
.99, mean = .95, standard deviation = .02). In most cases the lowest
correlation was found between Scoring System A and Scoring System B
(range, .67 to .93, mean = .80, standard deviation = .07). The correla-
tion between Scoring System B and Scoring System C was only slightly
higher (range, .70 to .94, mean = .82, standard deviation = . 06). These
results suggest that there is considerable similarity between all sys-
terns but that a relatively stronger similarity exists between Systems A
and C. This may say that C is just a more elaborate way of doing A,
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since they do share the characteristic of utilizing both obvious impli­
cations of modality reference and information supplied through querying 
of the subject. System B, on the other hand, lacks this additional 
information. Exclusion of multi-modal predicates by both Systems B and 
C may account for at least a portion of the difference between Systems A 
and C (other changes in the scoring guidelines are also involved) and 
surely adds to the discrepancy between Systems A and B where the lowest 
correlations were found.
Correlations between Imagery Scores 
and Language Productions
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients between imagery 
and predicate scores were obtained within each language sub-sample and 
total language sample for each modality using all three scoring systems. 
Presented in Table 3 are the correlation coefficients obtained using 
Scoring System C. Since no essential differences were found attribut­
able to scoring system used and System C approximates the Bandler and 
Grinder method while incorporating more explicit guidelines, correlation 
coefficients obtained using Scoring Systems A and B are not presented 
here but appear for the interested reader's convenience in Appendixes B 
and C, respectively. Predicate frequency scores obtained using Scoring 
System C are presented in Appendix D.
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Table 3
Correlations between the Betts QMI and Language Scores:
Scoring System C
LANGUAGE SAMPLE I Language
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory .0160 -.1606 .1623 .0434 .1767
Betts/Visual .0783 -.2603 .2178 .0830 .1069
Betts/Kinesthetic -.2476 .0821 .0952 -.0238 .1123
Betts/Olfactory .0872 .1318 -.1652 -.0384 -.1947
Betts/Gustatory -.0201 .2026 -.2395 -.0790 -.1279
LANGUAGE SAMPLE II Language
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory -.1493 .0162 .2144 -.0484 -.0116
Betts/Visual -.0699 -.0467 .1106 .2912 -.1179
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1344 .0649 .0900 -.0122 .1974
Betts/Olfactory .2656 -.2466 -.1308 -.1057 .0830
Betts/Gustatory -.0139 .2481 -.2004 -.1225 -.0448
LANGUAGE SAMPLE III Language
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory -.1961 .1579 .2067 .1782 -.0979
Betts/Visual -.0810 -.1754 .0893 .1322 .1537
Betts/Kinesthetic .0533 -.1982 -.0681 .0377 .1795
Betts/Olfactory .2131 .1283 -.2730 -.2742 -.1388
Betts/Gustatory -.0103 .0047 .0675 -.0193 -.0110
TOTAL LANGUAGE SAMPLE Language
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory -.2733 -.0606 .2036 .1367 .1474
Betts/Visual -.0173 -.2670 .2703 .2951 .2097
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1052 .0288 .0966 -.0388 .2300
Betts/Olfactory .2724 •.0857 -.3745* -.2738 -.2834
Betts/Gustatory .0363 .1937 -.0965 -.0964 .1588
*^<•05 two-tailed, d.f.=40
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As can be seen in Table 3, most correlation coefficients were either 
slightly negative or very low positive. These results provide no sup­
port for the expected relationship between frequency of sensory modality 
specific predicates in spontaneous speech and the ability of the indi­
vidual to image vividly in the related modality.- Modality preference as 
measured by the Betts QMI does not appear to be related to language use 
as measured by the present procedures.
Pattern Analyses
Given that vividness of imagery and frequency of modality spe­
cific predicates were not found to positively correlate, it was decided 
to subject both imagery and language data to pattern analyses in order 
to determine whether groups of similar individuals could be identified 
using these two measures. On the basis of evidence in the literature as 
well as the viewpoint espoused by Bandler and Grinder, it was antici­
pated that groups of subjects would be identified in which members 
resembled each other more than any non-group member in the pattern of 
their scores across modalities. That is, the various groups would be 
distinguished by having notably higher and/or lower scores in certain 
modes when compared with the other identified groups of subjects. It 
was further expected that the patterns of predicate usage discovered for 
the total language sample would be replicated in each language sub­
sample, but would not necessarily match the patterns of imagery vividness 
found for the QMI scores for any given group since imagery and predicate 
use were not correlated. In sum, groups of subjects were expected to be
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found showing distinctive patterns of high/low modality scores in 
imagery and language use.
Pattern analyses were run separately on the QMI scores and the 
scores for the language sub-samples and total language samples. Each 
pattern analysis did produce distinct groupings of subjects character­
ized by particularly high/low scores for certain sensory modalities in 
both imagery vividness and frequency of modality specific predicates. 
Across language samples, however, the various groups did not maintain 
stable membership. That is, individual subjects were found to be mem­
bers of groups showing different patterns of strengths and weaknesses in 
the different language samples.
Figures 1 through 5 present the major groupings found within 
each set of data scores: Betts QMI, language sub-samples I, II, III, 
and total language sample. Only pattern analysis results obtained using 
Scoring System C scores are presented for the language data since this 
scoring system was judged the most appropriate to the purpose of the 
study and is highly correlated with Scoring System A, the intuitive 
application of Bandler and Grinder's system in accordance with their 
directions for its implementation. The groups show contrasting mean 
scores for a variety of modalities and can be compared in several ways.
The identified groupings of subjects will first be described 
according to the relative differences between the groups in each modal­
ity and then according to the characteristic pattern of relative 
strengths and weaknesses across modalities within the individual groups.
Pattern Analysis of Betts QMI Scores
In Figure 1, summarizing the pattern analysis of the Betts QMI 
scores, six groups are graphed (A, B, C, D, E, F). It is clear from 
this graph of imagery vividness that considerable variability exists 
among the groups in all modes except the kinesthetic. All group means 
for kinesthetic imagery vividness fall within a five-point range and 
ranges of plus/minus one standard deviation of all means overlap. The 
kinesthetic means fall in the upper region of the continuum of all means 
graphed, indicating a relatively high level of kinesthetic imagery 
vividness. The auditory means are easily separated into groups showing 
three degrees of vividness: extremely high (D), extremely low (F), and 
moderate (B,A,C,E). Likewise, the visual means are separable into three 
similarly distinct groupings: extremely high (A), extremely low (E), 
and moderate (B,C,F,D). Olfactory means are dichotomous: either high 
(E,F,B) or low (A,D,C). In the gustatory mode one group is extremely 
low (B), three are high (C,E,F) and two are moderate (D,A), although one 
of these (D) overlaps slightly with the high group. There is an inter­
esting pattern of strengths and weaknesses evident in the graph. For 
every modality other than kinesthetic (in which all groups are alike) 
some group(s) rank particularly high or low.
From Table 4 it can be seen that every sensory modality is rep­
resented in the set of high scoring groups and in the set of low scoring 
groups. Two (E,F) of the three high ranking olfactory groups (E,F,B) 
are also high in the gustatory group (C,E,F). Three groups are low in 
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Gustatory C,E,F B
high and low ranking group. The patterns of relative strength and weak-
ness typifying the individual groups appear in 
Table 5
Table 5.
Characteristic Degree of Imagery Vividness in the Five








In general, pairs of groups show opposing patterns, as demon- 
stratet in Table 6. In the latter case an exception is that low olfac­
tory for group D becomes high gustatory for group F. It is apparent 
from the results of this pattern analysis that quite distinct groups of 
individuals can be identified according to the pattern of their self- 
reported ranking of imagery vividness in the various sensory modalities
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Table 6
Opposing Patterns of Imagery Vividness
Group A: High Visual v. 
Low Olfactory
Group E: High Olfactory 
Low Visual
Group B: High Olfactory v. 
Low Gustatory
Group C: High Gustatory 
Low Olfactory
Group D: High Auditory v. 
Low Olfactory
Group F: High Gustatory 
Low Auditory
as measured by the Betts QMI. And, further, that the nature of these 
group differences involve both exceptionally high and exceptionally low 
imagery vividness in all sensory modalities. The single exception was 
the uniform, moderately high ranking of all groups in kinesthetic 
imagery.
Pattern Analysis of Language Sub-Sample 
I Scores
In Figure 2, summarizing the pattern analysis of scores obtained 
in Language Sub-Sample I, patterns of five groups are depicted (A,B,C,D, 
E). This graph differs markedly from that obtained for the imagery 
scores. There is much less variability between group means for the dif­
ferent modalities and the overall pattern indicates that subjects used 
predicates specific to the different modalities with extremely different 
frequencies. Use of olfactory and gustatory predicates is markedly 
depressed (and distinct groups are not separable) when compared with the 
frequency of kinesthetic predicates. Kinesthetic means are highest of 














Fig. 2. Pattern analysis of Language Sub-Sample I using Scoring System
C scores for five sensory modalities (Group A,B,C,D,F).
65
moderately high (D,E,C) groups. More variability exists among groups in 
the auditory and visual modes where tri-partite divisions are possible.
In visual predicate use, one group scored very high (C), two moderate 
(B,D) and two low (A,E). Auditory groups were high (E), moderate (D), 
and low (A,C,B). The pattern of high/low frequency use evident in the 
graph is unlike that found for imagery scores but presents some interest­
ing relationships between groups, as shown in Table 7.
Table 7
High and Low Groups in Modality Specific Predicate 
Frequencies: Language Sub-Sample I
Modes High Low
Auditory E A , B , G
Visual C A, E
Kinesthetic A, B D,E,C
Olfactory - A,B/E,D,C
Gustatory - A,B/E,D,C
The group using most auditory predicates (E) ranked with the 
groups using the fewest visual (A,E), kinesthetic (D,E,C), olfactory 
(E,D,C), and gustatory (E,D,C). The group using the most visual predi­
cates (C) ranked with the groups using fewest auditory (A,B,C), kines­
thetic (D,E,C), olfactory (E,D,C), and gustatory (E,D,C). The two 
groups using the most kinesthetic predicates (A,B) differed from each 
other slightly in that only one of them (A) ranked with the groups using 
fewest visual predicates (A,E). Both (A) and (B), however, ranked with 
the groups using fewest auditory (A,B,C). Additionally, while included 
in the low olfactory and gustatory groups, these two (A,B) were in both
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cases the highest scoring among them. One group (D) ranked low in olfac­
tory and gustatory predicate use but was not high scoring in any modal­
ity. The two notable trends here are (a) that the high auditory group 
(E) was low visual and the low auditory group (C) was high visual; and 
(b) that the two high kinesthetic groups (A,B) were the highest of the 
olfactory and gustatory groups while the lowest kinesthetic groups 
(D,E,C) were the lowest of the olfactory and gustatory groups. These 
trends appear throughout the language sample analyses and will be 
pointed out in the relevant sections to follow.
Pattern Analysis of Language 
Sub-Sample II Scores
In Figure 3, summarizing the pattern analysis of scores obtained 
in Language Sub-Sample II, six groups were examined (A,B,C,D,E,F). The 
general form of this graph is very similar to that for Language Sub- 
Sample I: low olfactory and gustatory frequencies, high kinesthetic, 
and variable auditory and visual. The groups are not clearly separable 
in the olfactory and gustatory modes due to the overlap of their stan­
dard deviation ranges (plus and minus one). In all other modes distinct 
groupings appear: four in kinesthetic, three in visual, five in audi­
tory. The kinesthetic groups include one extremely high (B,C,A), one 
moderate (F), and two evenly spaced between them (E) and (D). In the 
visual mode appear one rather high group (D), one low (B,F,A,E) and one 
slightly above this (C). There is an extremely high group (F) in the 
auditory mode and an extremely low group (D). In between these we find 
one high (E) and two relatively low groups (A) and (C,B). Examining the 







Fig. 3. Pattern analysis of Language Sub-Sample II using Scoring System
C scores for five sensory modalities (Groups A,B,C,D,E,F).
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in Language Sub-Sample I is evident. The two groups showing high audi­
tory predicate usage (F,E) were low in use of predicates specific to the 
visual, olfactory, and gustatory modes and one (F) was also relatively 
low in kinesthetic predicate use.
Table 8
High and Low Groups in Modality Specific Predicate 
Frequencies: Language Sub-Sample II
Modes High Low





The group high in use of visual predicates (D) was low in audi­
tory and also in olfactory and gustatory. The three groups high in 
kinesthetic (B,C,A) were low in olfactory and gustatory as well as in 
visual (only B,A). Again, the high auditory groups (F,E) were low vis­
ual and the low auditory (D) was high visual. The high kinesthetic 
groups (B,C,A) were, as in Language Sub-Sample I, the highest of the low 
olfactory and gustatory groups while the low kinesthetic group (F) was 
lowest of these.
Pattern Analysis of Language 
Sub-Sample III Scores
In Figure 4, summarizing the pattern analysis of scores obtained 
in Language Sub-Sample III, five groups were examined (A,B,C,D,E). Here 
too, the kinesthetic mode showed a very high frequency of predicate
Fig. 4. Pattern analysis of Language Sub-Sample III using Scoring 
System C scores for five sensory modalities (Groups A,B,C,D,E).
no
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usage, the olfactory and gustatory very low usage, and auditory consid­
erable variability. A difference found in this graph is the low fre­
quency of visual predicates. In the olfactory and gustatory modes two 
distinct groupings are identifiable, although all groups are low. The 
highest of these includes two groups (D,C) and the lowest, three (B,A,E). 
The kinesthetic mode is separable into three groups, one extremely high 
(D,C,A) another slightly lower (B) and one somewhat lox̂ er still, 
although in the upper region of the continuum of all group means (E). 
Groups are dichotomized in the visual mode into a very low set (A,D,E,B) 
and one group only slightly higher (C). The greatest variability among 
group means is found in the auditory mode where there are a high group 
(E) and a low group (C) and two other groups (B) and (A) spaced evenly 
in between. Similar relationships between groups in high/low scorings 
appear here as in the previous language sample graphs.
Table 9
High and Low Groups in Modality Specific Predicate 
Frequencies: Language Sub-Sample III
Modes High Low
Auditory E, B, A D,C
Visual C A,D,E,B
Kinesthetic D,C,A / E
Olfactory - D,C/B,A,E
Gustatory D,C/B,A,E
The three highest groups in auditory (E,B,A) were included in 
the lowest visual group (A,D,E,B) and the highest of these (E) was low­
est in kinesthetic predicate usage and in olfactory and gustatory as
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well. The highest visual group (C) was included in the lowest auditory 
group (D,C). Of the group using most kinesthetic predicates (D,C,A) two 
member groups (D,C) were lowest in auditory predicate usage and highest 
in use of olfactory and gustatory predicates. This follows the trend 
established by Language Sub-Sample I and Language Sub-Sample II, al­
though somewhat more variability is evident here.
Pattern Analysis of Total 
Language Sample Scores
In Figure 5, summarizing the pattern analysis of scores obtained 
in the Total Language Sample, six groups are portrayed (A,B,C,D,E,F).
The Total Language Sample scores represent subjects' productions of 
modality specific predicates across all three language sub-samples. The 
graph shows less variability of group means in all modes although the 
same general pattern is evident as in the previous graphs, as would be 
expected given the considerable similarity of the earlier graphs: high 
kinesthetic, low olfactory, gustatory, and visual, and variable auditory 
frequencies. Olfactory and gustatory predicate usage is particularly 
low although two groups are discriminable in each of these modes. The 
higher olfactory group has three members (B,E,A) as does the lower (F,D, 
C). In the gustatory mode, however, the higher group (E,B,A,D) includes 
a low olfactory group (D) while the lower group contains only (C) and 
(F). The kinesthetic mode is dichotomized into an extremely high group 
(B,E,A,D,C) and a group only slightly lower (F). The visual mode is 
also dichotomized, but at a low level (although not as low as the olfac­
tory and gustatory modes), into a lower group (D,C,B,F,A) and a group 





Fig. 5. Pattern analysis of Total Language Sample using Scoring System 






the auditory mode where five groups are identifiable and evenly spaced 
from the highest (F) through middle groups (C) , (D,A), and (B) to the 
lowest group (E). Examining the highest and lowest scoring groups we 
find the following relationships:
Table 10
High and Low Groups in Modality Specific Predicate 







The general trends noted earlier are evident here as well, although not 
as clearly. The highest auditory group (F) is among the lowest visual 
(D,C,B,F,A) as well as the lowest kinesthetic, olfactory and gustatory, 
while the lowest auditory (E) is the highest visual. Of the five high 
kinesthetic groups (B,E,A,D,C) three are also highest olfactory (B,E,A) 
and four the highest gustatory (E,B,A,D).
The overriding trend across all language samples was extremely 
high frequency in production of kinesthetic predicates, very low fre­
quency of olfactory and gustatory predicates, some variability in visual 
and much variability in auditory predicates. Within each modality, 
including at times those with low frequency of use, it was possible to 
discriminate among groups which show relatively higher/lower scores when 
compared with the remaining groups. The highest kinesthetic groups were
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also highest in olfactory and gustatory modes while the lowest kines­
thetic groups were lowest in olfactory and gustatory, given that olfac­
tory and gustatory predicate frequencies were consistently low compared 
with the other modalities.
These pattern analysis findings are important to consider in 
evaluating results of this study as they raise many interesting possi­
bilities relevant to the lack of correlation found between language and 
imagery scores. These questions and possibilities suggest several ave­
nues for future research in imagery, language, and related areas.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to test Bandler -and Grinder's basic 
assumption that predicate usage corresponds to the speaker's degree of 
awareness within the related sensory modality. It was predicted that 
the frequency with which predicates representative of each sensory modal­
ity appeared in the spontaneous speech of a subject would correlate pos­
itively with that subject's ability to experience vivid and clear imag­
ery in that mode. The use of imagery as a measure of the relative devel­
opment of a sensory modality in representing experience was suggested by 
Bandler and Grinder's assumption that imagery is relatively more clear 
and vivid in favored representational systems. Support for this proce­
dure is found in the functional similarity between perception and 
imaging (Sheehan, 1966a, 1966b).
The findings obtained in this study show no significant positive 
correlations between imagery and Language Sub-Samples I, II, III, or the 
Total Language Sample. Pattern analyses performed separately on the 
imagery scores and on each set of language scores, however, did identify 
groups of subjects with distinctive strengths and weaknesses across the 
five sensory modalities. All QMI groups evidenced moderately high kines­
thetic imagery; in each other mode extreme groups were identified. In 
contrast, each language pattern analysis produced distinct groupings of 
subjects in each modality but the overall characteristic of the patterns
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showed low frequency of olfactory and gustatory predicates, high kines­
thetic predicate usage and considerable variability of usage in auditory 
and visual modes. The clusters of subjects did not maintain stable mem­
bership across language sub-samples and did not match the imagery group­
ings. These findings suggest several things which might have contrib­
uted to the unfavorable results obtained. The model itself may not be 
valid— perhaps there is in fact no relationship between the sensory 
nature of a person's experience and the predicates he uses to describe 
his experience. It is also possible that, even if the model is valid, 
imagery may be a poor measure, of sensory modality preference. Then, 
there are the numerous difficulties encountered in the collection and 
scoring of the language data which may have severely biased results. 
Lastly, the flexibility of the normal population in representing experi­
ences in various ways may have made the expected pattern difficult to 
find. Perhaps, subjects from a psychopathological population would 
prove a more fruitful group to examine.
Imagery as a Measure of Sensory Modality Preference
The use of imagery as a measure of sensory modality development 
could be inappropriate. Not only are introspective self-reports (the 
sole means of assessing subjective imagery experiences) impossible to 
confirm objectively, but it is also possible that the ability to image 
in a modality, while functionally similar to perception, may not reflect 
actual perceptual processing. That is, one may be able to image to a 
greater or lesser degree than he is actually sensitive to external stim­
ulation and this imagery ability may not be equally well-developed
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across modes. Furthermore, the ability to conjure up a clear and vivid 
image in response to a given stimulus may be unrelated to a person's use 
of imagery in everyday life as a part of his natural cognitive function­
ing. For example, one might rarely use imagery in normal thinking, but 
yet be able to create a vivid image upon request. Contrariwise, one may 
lack good clear and vivid imagery but yet rely heavily upon lower qual­
ity imagery in normal thought processes. Although evidence cited in the 
review of literature seems to support a positive relationship between 
ability to perform certain cognitive tasks and degree of imagery ability 
within the related modality, whether or not differential imagery use is 
in any way related to actual perceptual sensitivity is uncertain. The 
Betts Questionnaire is the paper and pencil measure of imagery most 
widely used in imagery research and the only one structured to equitably 
tap imagery in the various sense modalities. However, only five items 
relate to any one modality and this may not be a sufficient number to 
adequately sample the range of experiences possible within a mode, nor 
sufficient to guarantee that all subjects will have the degree of famil­
iarity with the items to enable them to recreate the experience vividly 
in their imagination. Furthermore, in published studies the QMI has 
been used primarily as a measure of general imaging ability so that, 
although inter-sensory comparisons of imagery vividness are easily cal­
culated, rarely has the measure been used to obtain this information. 
Consideration of these issues raises the possibility that it is not the 
Bandler-Grinder theory itself which is faulty, but the assumption that 
sensory modality preference is demonstrable through vividness and
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clarity of mental imagery as measured, necessarily but very inadequately 
through introspective self-report.
Measurement of Predicate Use
The collection and scoring of language data was rife with tech­
nical problems, solution of which was made especially difficult by the 
lack of similar research in the area. Studies relating imagery and lan­
guage have involved the rating of words for imagery value or self-report 
of imagery in response to words (Paivio, Yuille & Madigan, 1968; Raju, 
1946; Walker, 1970). Therefore, it is possible that the procedure 
lacked the refinement and sensitivity to provide an adequate measure of 
predicate usage. Some of the major language sampling difficulties 
deserve consideration here.
Initially, formulation of a suitable request for a speech sample 
was problematic. To ensure a sufficiently large language sample, three 
separate requests were posed. The result was that in some cases the 
quantity of spontaneous speech obtained was so great as to be nearly 
unmanageable for scoring purposes. This procedure was advantageous for 
the reticent subject, however, given that the experimenter could not 
guide or verbally encourage such a subject to provide further informa­
tion lest the language sample be inadvertently biased in the direction 
of a modality through the experimenter's use of modality specific words 
or suggestion of content areas. One consequence of the tremendous vari­
ance in speech sample length which resulted was that the shorter samples 
could be subjected to more intense analysis and inquiry than the 
extremely long samples, given the time limitations inherent in the study
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This may have caused the deletion from final scoring of critical predi­
cates for some subjects. Even though every attempt was made to specify 
all the major predicates, sometimes it simply was not possible to do so.
Having three speech samples per subject raised further complica­
tions. While the first request was completely unspecified as to modal­
ity, the second two were biased towards the kinesthetic mode as defined 
by Bandler and Grinder through asking for a description of liked and 
disliked experiences. Although these two requests did not necessarily 
serve to elicit kinesthetic predicates, they did require attentiveness 
to kinesthetic information by virtue of directing the subject towards 
affective content areas. That is, a subject could respond by describing 
an experience related to the visual or auditory mode, but the underlying 
experience eliciting that particular description was kinesthetic— his 
feelings towards the experience. Therefore, the response to the second 
two language sub-sample requests is confounded by the very nature of the 
requests themselves. It was interesting, however, to note that many 
subjects provided highly affect-laden descriptions for the first lan­
guage sub-sample and described comparatively benign matters for the 
second and third, thus further confusing the issue. The correlations 
between imagery and language scores were calculated separately for each 
language sub-sample and total language sample so as to detect any dif­
ferences which might be attributable to the nature of the three requests. 
When the correlations for the completely unspecified first language sub­
sample did not differ appreciably from the correlations for the second 
and third language sub-samples, the effect of any kinesthetic bias inher­
ent in the second and third requests was essentially nullified.
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The pattern analyses were performed in order to ascertain 
whether the imagery and language measures, while not correlated, were 
independently differentiating between groups of subjects. If so, it 
would suggest that the two measures, singly effective, were assessing 
different things and a more appropriate tool than the QMI was needed to 
determine sensory modality preference. The results of the pattern 
analyses do show that both imagery and language measures successfully 
discriminate between subjects.
The distinct groups identified on the basis of the QMI scores 
did not match the groups obtained for predicate usage (not unexpectedly 
given the lack of correlation). According to the QMI pattern, groups 
showed great variability, being high scoring in some modes and low in 
others. Every mode (one exception) was represented by both high and low 
scoring groups. The single exception was the kinesthetic mode, in which 
all groups ranked alike and moderately high. This rather striking dif­
ference between kinesthetic and other modalities readily elicits specu­
lation as to cause. Barring some prejudicial element in the QMI (such 
as number and type of items, averaging of tactual, organic, and kines­
thetic scores, etc.), questions arise regarding a generalized tendency 
among humans to be sensitive to kinesthetic stimulation at a rather high 
level. Possibly this may be due to the crucial role of kinesthetic 
stimulation in survival. One can lose use of auditory, visual, olfac­
tory, and gustatory sense organs and maintain a reasonably normal exis­
tence. But loss of kinesthetic sensitivity is suggestive of death, at 
worst, and at best is a debilitating handicap. Persons who are unre­
sponsive to pain are deprived of important danger signals and can be
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critically injured by fire or disease without awareness. The most fun­
damental aspect of the living organism is its general bodily nature, 
including the internal, organic functions, tactual contact with the 
environment, and feedback from physical movement. Beyond these essen­
tial, inherent qualities, the auditory, visual, olfactory, and gusta­
tory sensory systems provide additional useful information. In some 
species certain sensory systems have undergone specialization and 
through the evolutionary process have come to serve an important sur­
vival function: enhanced olfaction in dogs, vision in birds of prey, 
etc. It is interesting to speculate that mankind as a species is par­
ticularly attuned to kinesthetic information and that additionally the 
other sensory systems have developed to different degrees across indi­
viduals. This suggestion presupposes a direct relationship between 
imagery and perception. Another possibility is that differential imag­
ery ability may have independently evolved into the unusual patterns.
The Betts pattern analysis finding becomes even more curious 
when compared with the language sample pattern analyses. The kines­
thetic mode shows a consistent and distinct character in the language 
graphs which is different from that found for the Betts. All groups 
were high scoring in the kinesthetic mode although some differentiation 
between groups was frequently possible. Compared with other modalities, 
kinesthetic group means were markedly and consistently higher across all 
language samples. This is especially noticeable given the very low 
olfactory and gustatory group means and the relatively low ranges of 
groups in the auditory and visual modes. Some possible explanations for 
this distinctive pattern are that, given the correspondence between high
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predicate use and the uniformly high groupings in kinesthetic imagery, 
high kinesthetic predicate usage may reflect greater sensitivity to 
kinesthetic stimulation, for the same reasons mentioned earlier to 
explain the kinesthetic imagery pattern. Another possibility is that 
the English language is so structured that the majority of predicates 
used are scoreable as kinesthetic, even though the matter under discus­
sion is specific to another modality. For example, one subject said:
"I don't like onions. When I eat onions I gag. I get heartburn and it 
makes me ill. . . .  as soon as I taste it I'm aware of it." This sub­
ject was describing a food and what it was like to eat it. One would 
expect gustatory predicates and yet almost without exception kines­
thetic predicates occur in the speech sample. Another subject also 
describing an aversion to onions provided a long diatribe against the 
food and following inquiry it was determined that even with the sub­
ject's thorough coverage of every aspect of onions, still kinesthetic 
predicates outnumbered gustatory and olfactory 2:1. Possibly there is a 
high baseline of kinesthetic words in English speech and the variabil­
ity evident in kinesthetic group means reflects differences in groups 
due to the differential development of the mode for representation above 
the generally high level shared by all English speakers. It does seem 
strange, but undeniable, that persons clearly discussing a topic closely 
tied to a given modality scored so low in predicates specific to that 
modality. Perhaps, there is only so much one can say about taste and 
smell. These are, after all, poorly developed senses in the human and 
perhaps our language reflects that in making relatively few discriminat­
ing predicates available for description. One thinks of the many
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Eskimo words for "snow". Where there is need for discrimination perhaps 
a greater selection of words is developed to serve that need.
Scoring procedures, vital to the outcome of the study, consti­
tute another area of difficulty. Guidelines were necessarily developed 
in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, following the logic of the Bandler- 
Grinder theory as closely as practicable. One scoring problem which 
arose repeatedly in different contexts involved the difference between a 
subject's image of an action performed by another and the actual behav­
ior of the observed individual. The question was whether the predicate 
used was to be scored according to how the subject was aware of the 
behavior, e.g., by visually observing it, or according to how the behav­
ing organism itself expressed it, e.g., by physically moving. While 
Handler and Grinder do suggest the technique of asking how you could 
verify the action, a more accurate representation of the actual predi­
cate used seemed more congruent with the purpose of the study. There­
fore, predicates were frequently scored according to obvious implication 
of mode when the subject would have been aware of it through another 
mode. For example, when a subject said: "the fish were swimming", 
according to the verification method "swimming" would have been scored 
according to how the subject reported he was aware of it and that might 
have been visual through looking into the brook or auditory if he heard 
them splashing in the water. The predicate "swimming" however, implies 
a kinesthetic behavior and it therefore seemed only logical to code the 
word kinesthetic. Since a rather important, fundamental question is 
involved here and one not readily answered, it was decided to rely on
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context to determine which perspective was the most appropriate to take. 
Certainly, a clearer and more definitive guideline is required.
Another difficulty involved the frequently over-used phrase "you 
know". Subjects were asked what they meant by the phrase and most often 
explained it was a means of checking with the listener to be sure the 
relevant material was understood and accepted. In Scoring Systems A and 
C which made use of subject supplied information to specify unspecified 
and ambiguous predicates, "know" was accordingly scored the same as the 
relevant predicate. In Scoring System B "know" was not included in the 
scoring unless it was clear from context to which mode it referred.
These scoring decisions, while defensible, nevertheless remain arbitrary 
and considerably more research is necessary in order to arrive at an 
adequate set of guidelines for scoring.
The question of Deep Structure is important to consider since it 
plays a crucial role in implementation of the Meta-Model for Therapy.
The therapist, following the rules of the MMT identifies from the cli­
ent's Surface Structures the underlying Deep Structure and asks the 
client to supply elements deleted, distorted, etc. This study focussed 
on modality specific predicates occurring in speech and it was not 
intended to delve beneath the Surface Structures beyond requesting ampli­
fication of the ambiguous and unspecified predicates which actually 
appeared in the speech sample. In other words, deletions were not 
sought. This meant that if the subject in fact were able to supply 
deleted predicates because they were present in his conscious model of 
the world and merely deleted for convenience, these accessible predi­
cates did not count in their language scores. Considerable information
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may have been lost this way but time restraints precluded a more thor­
ough appraisal of subjects' language use. The major intent of the study 
was to relate Surface Structure predicates to imagery vividness, as this 
appeared basic to the Bandler-Grinder assumptions under consideration, 
and so predicates scored were limited to those appearing in the language 
samples directly.
A further complication arises in the form of what Bandler and 
Grinder term "fuzzy functions". These are functions which occur when 
the subject inputs information in one sensory mode but stores it or rep­
resents it to himself in another mode. According to Bandler and Grinder, 
one might hear music (auditory) and represent the experience as a feel­
ing (kinesthetic) or one might see a person's angry expression (visual) 
and code a comment (auditory) not actually uttered. These are not 
unusual experiences. They confound the scoring of predicates to an 
unknown degree whenever context or obvious specificity is relied on 
rather than direct explication by the subject. The degree of confusion 
introduced by fuzzy functions is even more impressive when one considers 
that whatever the subject's response to inquiry, it also may involve a 
fuzzy function. Due to the complexity of this aspect of language use, 
it was decided to score predicates as objectively as possible and not to 
attempt identification of fuzzy functions. Again, the primary goal was 
to test the strength of the proposed bridge between language use and 
imagery. As such, it seemed most sensible to take language predicates 
at face value. Fuzzy functions, therefore, may have affected the 
results appreciably. Contrariwise, it is also possible that at times 
fuzzy functions have been inappropriately invoked to account for such
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predicate usage. Bandler and Grinder have failed to make a discrimina­
tion which could have considerable importance to their theory and which 
may have contributed substantially to the high frequency count of kines­
thetic predicates. They have labelled as kinesthetic not only periph­
eral and internal body sensations, but also affect. Although, affect is 
frequently accompanied by physiological expressions, another component 
is a higher level, evaluative sort of cognition. This mental function 
may not be specific to any modality. Thus, the Bandler-Grinder concep­
tualization of "feeling" as a kinesthetic experience may have led to a 
scoring practice which unjustifiably relegated an undetermined quantity 
of affect-related predicates to this mode. Following this line of rea­
soning, the kinesthetic mode, surfeited with pseudo-kinesthetic predi­
cates, has acquired its high predicate content through faulty scoring.
One final matter concerns the population sampled by the study. 
While Bandler and Grinder do assert that sensory modality preference is 
typical of all persons, to some degree, the differences are ostensibly 
more prominent in pathological groups. The pattern analyses show 
clearly that within a normal population differentiation is possible on 
the basis of frequency of modality specific predicates in speech. Even 
though speech and imagery were not correlated, this does provide some 
support for the Bandler and Grinder theory.
In summary, then, results of the study did not confirm the pre­
diction of a positive relationship between imagery vividness and fre­
quency of modality specific predicates in speech. However, it was found 
that individuals in a normal population can be grouped according to
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distinctive patterns of strengths and weakness in both imagery vividness 
and frequency of use of modality specific predicates.
Implications for the Bandler and Grinder Theory
The findings discussed above carry implications important to the 
Bandler-Grinder theory and suggest some possible avenues for future 
research. Three important issues concern scoring of predicate usage, 
practical application of the model, and selection of the target 
population.
The difficulties encountered in scoring predicate usage are 
serious and complex. Innumerable technical decisions must be made and 
explicit guidelines established to permit consistent and appropriate 
specification of predicates. Some of the particular scoring problems 
have already been remarked upon. Others include determination of 
exactly which predicates to evaluate. It is clearly neither appropri­
ate nor practicable to attempt specification of all adverbs, adjectives, 
verbs, and process nouns. A careful and thorough inventory of English 
predicates and language use is requisite to the compilation of suitable 
guidelines. It must be established precisely which classes of words are 
to be considered and how, in cases of uncertainty, to determine modality 
reference. The quantity of technical scoring difficulties which, 
appeared during treatment of the data implies insufficient attention to 
critical aspects of the data mass during construction of their model by" 
Bandler and Grinder. Considering the emphasis placed upon specificity 
and exactitude, it is surprising that greater care and meticulous atten­
tion to detail are not evident upon close examination of the theory.
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The Bandler-Grinder theory is intuitively appealing and attrac­
tive from a logical standpoint— until subjected to scrutiny and rigorous 
test. Practical application of the Meta-Model is problematic. It is 
unreasonable to expect to be able to focus sufficient attention on every 
word used by the individual so that inquiry can be made in each case of 
unspecified predicate. It therefore seems likely that not all predi­
cates are given equal weight or attention by the authors of this theory. 
Rather, from the unwieldy amount of predicates generated by subjects, 
one might readily assume that Bandler and Grinder, in fact, do not spec­
ify all predicates appearing in a client’s speech but direct particular 
attention towards certain key words. A major weakness in their instruc­
tions for implementation of the Meta-Model for Therapy is their failure 
to adequately delimit critical predicates. The data obtained in this 
study clearly demonstrate the need for complete and explicit application 
guidelines and the imprecise instructions provided do not speak well for 
the theory, suggesting a weak theoretical foundation underlying the 
elaborate and superficially impressive model they have constructed.
An interesting aspect of the pattern analysis findings does sup­
port Bandler and Grinder's basic assumption that people differ in their 
use of modality specific predicates (it does not, however, show these 
differences in frequency of modality specific predicates to be accom­
panied by like differences in vividness of imagery). Bandler and 
Grinder have proposed that sensory modality preference characterizes all 
persons but that it is especially evident in psychopathological groups 
where extremely selective attention frequently deprives the individual 
of much important information about his life situation. Although
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distinct groups were identified using subjects from a normal population, 
it is possible that the disparateness of the groups would be greater in 
a sample from a psychopathological population. A possible explanation 
for the change in group membership across language sub-samples is that 
normal individuals have greater flexibility in sensory modality use for 
representation. This greater freedom of choice would allow normals to 
switch representational systems with the particular topic of conversa­
tion. That is, some experiences may be represented auditorally, while 
others are kinesthetic or visual. An intra-topic preference is evident 
for these subjects but differs for the individual across topics: the 
effect appears to be contextual. One might expect the psychopatho­
logical individual to show a stronger and more persistent deficiency 
across language sub-samples.
Conclusion
These issues suggest that further research is necessary to 
determine whether the Bandler-Grinder theory is a valid one, whether 
modality specific predicate usage actually discriminates individuals 
according to the sensory nature of their experience as they have repre­
sented the experience to themselves. In order to accomplish this, an 
objective measure of individual differences in sensory/perceptual exper­
ience must be found to correlate positively with language use. The need 
for appropriate and adequate specification methods will require that dif­
ferent procedures be devised and tested. It would also be enlightening 
to sample psychopathological populations to determine whether these more 
than the normal population display consistent deficiencies across
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language sub-samples. Certain psychopathological groups may be found to 
exhibit distinctive patterns of sensory modality preference.
While criticized here for lack of sufficient specificity in 
application and scoring instructions, the Meta-Model for Therapy never­
theless represents a significant advance beyond .the level of earlier 
attempts to classify and define the interpersonal communication process 
and its role in change. It is considerably more explicit than earlier 
theories, yet the results of this study lead one to conclude that even 
greater specificity is required to permit application and interpretation 
of Bandler and Grinder’s Meta-Model for Therapy by different individuals












































BETTS QMI AVERAGE VIVIDNESS OF IMAGERY SCORES
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory




CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE BETTS QMI AND LANGUAGE SCORES:
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE I Language
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory -.0325 -.1236 .1092 .0489 .1831
Betts/Visual .0509 -.2097 .1504 .1223 .1107
Betts/Kinesthetic -.2397 .0875 .1705 -.0196 .1228
Betts/Olfactory .0597 .0532 -.0923 .0173 -.1679
Betts/Gustatory .0754 .1968 -.2463 -.1868 -.1725
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE II
Betts/Auditory -.1237 -.0359 .2277 -.0063 .0341
Betts/Visual -.0358 -.0559 .0543 -.3754* -.0749
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1311 .0338 .0954 -.0861 .2747
Betts/Olfactory .2165 -.1482 -.1703 -.1198 -.0065
Betts/Gustatory -.0183 .2182 -.1213 -.1867 -.0803
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE III
Betts/Auditory -.2620 .2527 .2762 .1998 -.1745
Betts/Visual -.0594 -.2155 .0618 .0847 .1142
Betts/Kinesthetic .0601 -.2118 -.0714 .0001 .1327
Betts/Olfactory .2324 .0959 -.3038* -.1820 -.0167
Betts/Gustatory .0040 -.0003 .0645 -.0704 -.0078
TOTAL LANGUAGE SAMPLE
Betts/Auditory -.2283 -.0041 .2272 .1173 .1493
Betts/Visual -.0095 -.3216* .1834 .2209 .1276
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1077 -.0055 .1127 -.0060 .2428
Betts/Olfactory .2336 .1341 -.3236* -.2204 -.2319






CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE BETTS QMI AND LANGUAGE SCORES:
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE I
Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
Betts/Auditory -.0013 -.1552 .0598 .0198 .1378
Betts/Visual .0872 -.1417 .2027 -.2193 -.0666
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1767 -.0425 '.1089 .1458 .2318
Betts/Olfactory .1247 .1083 -.2445 .0139 -.1778
Betts/Gustatory -.1022 .1750 -.0562 .0920 -.0033
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE II
Betts/Auditory -.1706 -.0641 .2631 .0134 .0898
Betts/Visual .0131 -.0260 .0061 .3245* -.1340
Betts/Kinesthetic -.1405 .1360 .0620 -.2039 .0777
Betts/Olfactory .1992 -.2729 .0024 .0596 .1276
Betts/Gustatory -.0112 .2906 -.2724 -.2581 -.0884
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE III
Betts/Auditory -.1039 .2850 .0376 .2665 -.1154
Betts/Visual -.0695 .0741 .0817 -.0508 .0586
Betts/Kinesthetic .1709 -.3186* -.1476 -.1445 .0376
Betts/Olfactory .0270 -.0283 .0085 -.1464 -.0032
Betts/Gustatory .0261 -.1253 -.0250 .0500 .0349
TOTAL LANGUAGE SAMPLE
Betts/Auditory -.1934 -.0286 .1446 .1225 .1235
Betts/Visual .0861 -.2236 .1892 .0631 -.0164
Betts/Kinesthetic .0303 -.1023 .0196 -.0868 .0710
Betts/Olfactory .1035 .1211 -.2310 -.0670 -.0471




LANGUAGE SAMPLE PREDICATE FREQUENCY SCORES: SCORING SYSTEM C 
LANGUAGE SUB-SAMPLE I
Subj ect Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
01 10 7 48 0 0
02 42 20 56 1 0
03 3 12 36 0 0
04 5 12 34 0 0
05 12 24 29 0 0
06 21 28 62 0 0
07 . 6 23 24 1 0
08 3 1 31 0 0
09 34 4 30 0 0
10 11 0 56 0 0
11 1 10 30 0 0
12 9 16 50 0 0
13 7 5 13 0 0
16 5 7 13 0 0
17 9 2 11 0 0
20 13 39 25 0 0
21 29 2 27 0 0
22 12 0 18 0 0
23 31 16 177 2 0
24 0 11 27 0 0
25 3 28 4 0 0
26 0 2 46 0 0
27 1 4 17 0 0
28 1 0 4 0 2 .
30 5 0 36 0 0
31 4 11 18 0 0
32 11 6 15 0 0
33 26 15 59 0 0
34 5 10 42 0 0
35 15 • 1 23 0 0
36 19 10 70 0 0
37 6 15 86 0 0
38 15 12 49 0 1
39 19 29 57 0 0
40 3 0 28 0 0
41 2 12 60 0 0
45 11 5 32 0 0
46 4 5 23 0 0
47 13 15 61 3 0
48 33 11 32 0 0
50 0 0 24 0 0




Subj ect Auditory Visual Kinesthetic Olfactory Gustatory
01 5 0 18 0 0
02 1 2 5 0 2
03 2 6 48 0 0
04 4 3 49 1 0
05 7 2 31 0 9
06 47 18 57 0 0
07 2 0 23 0 3
08 12 0 14 0 0
09 17 0 23 0 1
10 5 0 39 0 0
11 1 5 24 0 0
12 1 4 15 0 0
13 6 0 17 0 0
16 4 0 25 0 0
17 1 6 30 0 0
20 6 2 44 0 0
21 0 4 32 0 5
22 2 3 23 0 0
23 2 5 19 0 0
24 0 0 18 0 0
25 11 2 7 0 0
26 6 5 25 0 0
27 4 0 6 0 0
28 1 0 23 0 0
30 12 4 41 0 0
31 7 11 11 0 0
32 1 4 14 0 0
33 9 4 29 0 0
34 0 8 9 0 0
35 4 5 15 0 0
36 28 0 42 0 0
37 8 28 78 0 0
38 0 4 56 0 0
39 30 4 33 0 0
40 1 1 23 0 0
41 5 7 36 0 '■ 2
45 5 2 21 0 0
46 17 13 45 0 0
47 32 4 15 0 0
48 6 11 58 10 0
50 0 11 9 0 0




















































































































































































MEMBERSHIP OF GROUPS IDENTIFIED BY PATTERN ANALYSES
Betts QMI
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